Chair Nancy Dragani called to order the July 7, 2008 meeting of the Utility Radiological Safety Board of Ohio at 1:30 p.m.

The first order of business was roll call, taken by Ramona Hauenstein.

I. ROLL CALL

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY          MS. NANCY DRAGANI
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH                   MR. ROBERT OWEN
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE              MR. ANTHONY MITCHELL
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION            MR. DAN FISHER
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY        MS. CINDY HAFNER
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE                MR. DEAN JAGGER

A quorum was declared.

II. READING OF THE APRIL MINUTES (ADOPTED)

The Board dispensed with reading of the April minutes. Ms. Dragani asked for any additions, corrections or deletions to the minutes. Ms. Dragani asked for a motion to approve the April minutes. Mr. Anthony Mitchell of the Department of Agriculture (ODA) moved to adopt the minutes and Mr. Robert Owen of the Department of Health (ODH) seconded. The motion was carried.

III. NEW BUSINESS

A. Ms. Carol O’Claire reviewed the Working Group initiatives led by Ohio Emergency Management Agency (EMA).

The Beaver Valley Nuclear Power Station Exercise (partial participation for the state) was held on June 24. Ohio EMA has received the draft exercise report. There are no ARCA’s or deficiencies for the State.

Columbiana County received 2 Area Requiring Corrective Action’s (ARCA’s), 1 is outstanding. The new ARCA was on vehicle monitoring and the other was re-demonstrated and cleared.

Perry Nuclear Power Plant 100 day meeting is this week, July 9. This is a full participation exercise for the State, so the EOC will be activated. The dry run will be September 17; the exercise will be on October 7. The State will demonstrate all capabilities.

Reactor Oversight matrix was reviewed.
The After Action meeting now includes items from the Beaver Valley Exercise.

IZRRAG: Perry is the next facility on the schedule to have an ingestion exercise. It will be held in 2012. Tabletop exercises will continue to be held on the odd years.

There will be hostile action drill involving Davis-Besse on November 13, 2008 with the tabletop on October 16 and a hostile action drill involving Beaver Valley on January 27, 2009.

The Working Group has received the reporting protocol by FENOC. This protocol has been included in the Events of Possible Public Interest (EPPI) procedure (see below).

The Working Group has developed a procedure for which provides instructions to communicate non-emergency plant events or issues which have potential public interest to the Board Members. After discussion, Ms. Dragani and Mr. Owen were added to the list of people to receive EPPI notices.

B. Midwestern Report

Mr. Robert Owens was unable to attend the Midwestern Committee Meeting. Mr. Tom Breckenridge of Ohio EMA attended the Midwestern Committee Meeting. Handouts from the meeting were distributed. The Midwestern Council of State Governments (CSG) puts on the biennial meeting and it took place in June. The minutes will be out on July 21, 2008. The information presented was what activities will affect Ohio within the next year. There will be approximately 111 shipments of transuranic waste from generator sites east of Ohio. There are no set dates as of yet and routes have not been selected. There are 3 possible routes and the preliminary preference as of now is the northern route (Ohio Turnpike and I-90). While it involves more counties (15) and higher populations, the accident preparedness is higher. Consideration of route will be July 31 between ODH, PUCO and Midwest Council. At DOE they do computer route (TREGGIS) monitoring and this will be used to help determine routes. There is a possibility of funding and will have a revised WIPP Transportation Manual. It probably will not come out until the 2008-2009 time frame.

The next page in the handout had low level shipment schedule from April 2008 to March 2009. The low level waste shipments do not require any additional preparedness work or routing or escorting issues. These are considered ordinary commerce.

The third page was an action item list as a result of the meeting. The first half is the actions that will be provided by the state and the second half will be provided by the Council of State Governments Midwestern Office. There is another meeting scheduled December 16-17 in the Chicago area.
On the nuclear power plant side, there was some discussion of a Fermi 3. One of the other issues dealing with spent nuclear fuel shipments is that 28 nuclear power plants do not have rail head access. This could be an issue as it is estimated that 80 percent of shipments will be done by rail. Not affecting Ohio is a DOE contract with Energy Solutions Incorporated to take 6,000 tons of radioactive waste from Italy. It is going to Utah, and not travelling through Ohio. The Portsmouth uranium oxide transportation plan is being held up for 2 reasons: first is that they do not have a disposal site, and second is funding.

Mr. Owen reported on a discussion that he had with Lisa Sattler regarding the future. The Council doesn’t see the need for the Committee to continue to meet on a biennial basis. CSG has taken a 40 percent cut in their budget and this might be a way to make up some of that money, but no final decision has been made.

C. URSB Directives

One of the URSB directives was to look into the possibility of having a meeting at one the nuclear power plants. Ms. O’Claire contacted Davis-Besse and they were willing to reserve a meeting room at the Davis-Besse Administration Building and schedule a tour. The tour will be in the morning and the meeting will be in the afternoon at 1:30 on October 14. Ms. O’Claire needs the full name and social security number for those who would like to go on the tour as soon as possible. Right now she has about 20 people listed that would like to go on the tour.

The second was regarding the EPPI procedure, which was already discussed.

Mr. Sean Zalesny of Ohio EMA reported on the “Draft Preliminary Changes to the Interim REP Program Manual”. Mr. Zalesny reported that we are approaching probably the most significant changes to the REP program to date. There is the opportunity, due to the incorporation of hostile action based scenarios to improve on areas that have been criticized in the past. The key changes proposed are:

- Changing the predictability of the exercises; exercises could now start at any level or progress more rapidly through the various levels.

- To drive off-site actions, generally the exercise has to reach General Emergency. If not, controller injects must be used. The radiological release also could be varied, with some exercises with no release, some exceeding EPA Protective Action Guidelines (PAG’s) just beyond site boundaries, other more severe with exceeding EPA PAG’s beyond 5 miles. One exercise per cycle must be initiated due to a hostile action based event and you cannot have 2 no release scenarios in a row. This also led to a couple of other changes

- Incorporating ICS into protective action decision (PAD’s) making and activation of response personnel.
Evacuation possibly more harmful in some situations due to the nature of the hostile action.

Traffic and access control should be able to demonstrate their knowledge of their responsibilities up to and including verifying emergency worker credentials (credentialing). In a hostile action, credentialing would be very important.

Ms. Dragani announced that she had been invited to Washington, DC to testify in front of the NRC regarding the hostile action drills and changes in the REP program. There were 3 state directors; Ohio, California and Illinois and 1 county director, Lake County EMA Director Larry Greene invited to participate.

B. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Mr. Roland Lickus was present for the NRC, Region III. Mr. Lickus is retiring in September. Mr. Lickus was given a certificate of appreciation from the Board for his service along with Ohio State University regalia. He introduced the gentleman who is taking his place, Mr. Alan Barker, who gave the report for the NRC.

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant

The NRC resident inspector first quarter integrated inspection report was issued May 5. The inspection results were one NRC-identified finding and two self-revealing findings of very low safety significance. Additionally, the inspection report documents special inspection activities associated with compliance with requirements of Confirmatory Order EA-03-0214 and of Confirmatory Order EA-07-0199.

A NRC news release issued July 1, communicates the approval of a power uprate of approximately 1.6 percent of generating capacity for Davis-Besse.

Beginning today July 7, and lasting approximately two weeks, an independent assessment will evaluate the implementation effectiveness of the licensee’s corrective action program. The assessment will be used to identify areas for improvement requiring corrective actions. The assessment will also evaluate the rigor, criticality, and overall quality of available Davis-Besse internal self-assessment activities in the implementation of the Corrective Action Program.

Perry Nuclear Power Plant

On May 16, the NRC completed a 95001 supplemental inspection to assess the evaluation of a White Performance Indicator (PI) in the Unplanned Scrams area of the Initiating Events cornerstone resulting from five scrams that occurred over a one-year period. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified and the NRC concluded that the licensee understood the root causes and contributing causes of the issues, that the licensee identified
the extent of condition and extent of cause of the issues, and that the corrective actions were sufficient to address the causes and to prevent recurrence of the issues.

The NRC resident inspector first quarter integrated inspection report was issued May 8. The inspection results were five NRC-identified and four self-revealed findings of very low safety significance. In addition, two NRC-identified non-cited violations of NRC requirements, without an associated finding, were identified. Additionally, five licensee-identified violations of very low safety significance have been reviewed by the inspectors.

There has been recent press coverage on an individual’s concern that a leak of potentially radioactively contaminated water at Perry was not voluntarily reported to state and local authorities in accordance with NEI 07-07, “Industry Ground Water Protection Initiative – Final Guidance Document.” The NRC currently has this issue under review.

Regulatory Issue Summary 2008-008

The NRC issued this regulatory issue summary to endorse Revision 1 to Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) guidance document NEI 06-04, “Conducting a Hostile Action-Based Emergency Response Drill,” dated October 30, 2007. The NRC finds this document, with the staff clarifications noted, presents an acceptable methodology for licensees to conduct industry-wide, baseline, hostile action-based emergency preparedness (EP) drills.

Upcoming Regulatory Activities

Each calendar quarter, the resident inspectors and regional inspection staff, review the performance of all nuclear power plants in the region, as measured by the performance indicators and by inspection findings. Every six months the review involves a more detailed assessment of plant performance that includes staff from NRC headquarters, the regions, and resident inspectors as well as preparation of a performance report. Also every six months, based on plant performance reviews, NRC inspection plans for each reactor are determined for the following 18-month period. The next mid-cycle performance review results will tentatively be issued in September 2008 for Davis-Besse and Perry, along with the rest of the Region III plants. The mid-cycle performance review for Davis-Besse and Perry will be presented at the October URSB meeting.

A public meeting will be held tomorrow, July 8, to discuss comments on emergency preparedness draft preliminary rule language. If you can not attend, but would like to participate via phone, a bridge line will be available for the meeting.
C. Beaver Valley Power Station Exercise

Mr. Higaki reviewed the exercise from the plant perspective. There were 3 ARCA’s for all off-site agencies and 2 planning issues for Beaver County in Pennsylvania. There were no findings on-site.

D. Utility Reports

Beaver Valley Power Station

Unit 2 Refueling Outage April 14, 2008

The Unit 2 2R13 outage commenced on April 14th at 0001 hours and ended with generator synchronization on May 22nd at 2357 hours. The original outage schedule was 29 days and the actual outage length was 38 days 23 hours.

The most significant issue that impacted schedule duration was on May 16th the #2 High Pressure Turbine Bearing failed during turbine startup resulting in a 180 hour delay for repair and startup.

The 2R13 outage also incorporated a number of engineered safety, margin and reliability improvements, including:

- Installation of a new high pressure turbine that will increase generation capability and secondary efficiency.

- Replacement of the “A” and “C” main feedwater regulating valves.

- Set-point changes and instrument re-scaling for up-rated power conditions of 2900 MW(t).

- Installation of reflective metal insulation (RMI) on the reactor head, some loop piping, and selected steam generator cubicle piping to improve containment sump margin.

- Replaced the split pins in the upper reactor head internals to reduce the potential for loose parts in the reactor coolant system. Completed the 10 Year reactor vessel In-service inspection weld examinations.

- Replaced cooling tower flow distribution piping, installed low clog fill with an improved design to improve summer plant performance. All of the drift eliminators were replaced. Indications already are that tower efficiency has been significantly improved due to this outage scope.

- Emergent modifications included repair of the circumferential indication on reactor head penetration #51.
The personnel dose was 84.687 rem, meeting the outage goal of 88.000 rem and the 3rd lowest Beaver Valley outage dose received.

**Unit 1 Power Reduction February 22, 2008**

Unit 1 Cycle 19 spring water box cleaning commenced on Friday, February 22, 2008 with a return to 100% power on March 5, 2008. Scope of the reduction was for cleaning of all 4 condenser water boxes. Water boxes were isolated one at time; the system was opened cleaned and then returned to service.

**Unit 2 Steam Generator Level Excursion May 24, 2008**

On May 24th, 2008 at 09:38 during a plant startup power increase in preparation to roll the turbine and synchronize to the grid, Beaver Valley Unit-2 experienced Engineered Safety Features (ESF) actuation due to “A” Steam Generator (SG) HI-HI level indications. This ESF actuation initiated automatic actions resulting in full feedwater isolation, trip of the only operating “B” main feedwater pump and start of two auxiliary feedwater pumps.

The root cause of the steam generator high level transient that initiated the ESF actuation is that the Operations crew on duty during this event was unfamiliar with steam generator level control using bypass feed regulating valves at low power with main turbine off-line and consequently made excessive manual changes in feedwater flow to the steam generator.

The abnormal procedure required the crew to trip the reactor. This was not recognized and the crew instead responded to the alarm response instruction for the Hi-Hi alarm. The operating crew returned the plant to normal conditions and continued power ascension and synchronization to the grid. During the evolution reactor power remained stable at about 15 percent power.

An NRC notification was made as required because of the engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation. The failure to initiate the plant trip in accordance with the abnormal operating procedure was addressed through the corrective action program.

**Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station**

**Independent Assessments**

As part of the NRC confirmatory order related to the Davis-Besse reactor vessel head degradation event, Davis-Besse committed to perform independent assessments of four key programs for a period of five years (2004-2008). 2008 is the final year for performing these assessments.

The first of four independent assessments scheduled for 2008 has been completed. Following is a summary of the completed Operations Performance assessment:
No findings rising to the significance of an Area For Improvement.

Potential strengths:

- Shift Manager and Crew assessment meetings (with a Training representative present)
- Operator training
- Licensed Operator candidate succession

The Confirmatory Order Independent Assessments will continue at Davis-Besse through 2008. The schedule is as follows:

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<th>2008 CONFIRMATORY ORDER INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT SCHEDULE</th>
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15th Refueling Outage Delay/Steam Generator Tube Inspection

On Thursday, February 14, 2008, Davis-Besse completed its 15th Refueling Outage. The outage was extended 12 days beyond the original restart date of February 2nd, due to Turbine-Generator vibrations caused by the newly rebuilt rotor being out of balance. It was identified that one of four copper components affixed to the rotor was damaged and replaced with a similar component made of aluminum (weighing 19 pounds lighter) causing the rotor to vibrate. After investigation was completed, all four components were replaced with aluminum components resolving the imbalance on the rotor and eliminating the vibration problem.

During the outage, Davis-Besse replaced 76 of 177 fuel assemblies, rewound the 150-ton Turbine-Generator, completed more than 2,000 outage maintenance tasks, conducted thousands of visual and ultrasonic inspections of piping and equipment and managed several emergent issues. The team also completed work
related to the Alloy 600 project where 16 reinforcing welds were applied to Pressurizer components ensuring long-term structural integrity.

Other work completed included:

- Replacement of Feedwater Piping
- Inspection of the Reactor Head and Vessel
- Restoration of the Cooling Tower
- Replacement of the Condenser Steam Bellows
- Installation of new digital Control Room Recorders
- Upgrade of the Diesel Generator Governor System
- Inspection of the Steam Generators

During the course of the Steam Generator inspections, more than 95,000 examinations were performed on more than 30,000 individual SG tubes. 81 tubes were plugged and no significant issues were identified. All testing and repairs were completed ahead of schedule.

The team surpassed its most stringent goal in the area of radiological safety by ending the outage with less than 125 Rem.

Power Reductions April 25, 2008 and June 6, 2008

A successful planned downpower was conducted April 25 through April 27, 2008. The Davis-Besse team closed a number of plant equipment issues and completed all work safely and event-free. The main work activity involved repairing the control oil leak on the #1 Main Feedwater Pump (MFP). In addition to improving the condition of the equipment, completing this repair also closed out an operator burden requiring Operations to add oil more frequently, as well as empty the oil collection device each shift.

Additional work activities completed during the weekend downpower included:

- Conducting an alignment check and vibration testing on the #2 Circulating Water Pump
- Performing preventive maintenance (PM) on the #3 Condensate Pump Motor breaker
- Replacing the surge capacitor and performing PM on the #1 Condensate Pump Motor
- Testing Turbine valves
- Performing control rod drive exercising and
- Performing Local Leak Rate Testing on the personnel airlock following Containment entry

Work was completed in 36 hours as opposed to the initial time estimate of 55 hours.
The downpower conducted June 6 through June 8, 2008 was completed safely and event-free. The team closed a number of equipment issues. The primary reason for the downpower was to resolve control system oscillations associated with a servo valve for the #1 Main Feedwater Pump. Minor control system oscillation remains following the planned work. A plan is being developed to address this issue to ensure reliability. Other work activities performed during the downpower included:

- Turbine valve testing
- Control rod drive testing
- Replacement of an air regulator to Feedwater Heater 2-6 level control valve and
- Replacement of a vibration dampener on a Feedwater System pipe

Feedwater Tube Leak in Feedwater System March 7, 2008

Two tubes within one of Davis-Besse’s High Pressure Feedwater Heater units on the non-radioactive side of the plant failed on Friday, March 7, 2008. The Feedwater Heater tube failures were identified and repaired, and the heater brought back to service early on Tuesday, March 11, 2008.

The function of a High Pressure Feedwater Heater is to improve overall plant efficiency. Davis-Besse has a series of six high pressure heaters, each containing more than 1,500 U-shaped tubes that circulate non-radioactive water and pre-heat it, using extraction steam from the Turbine, to 475 degrees before sending it to the Steam Generators. There, it is turned into steam and directed across the turbine blades where it expends both heat and energy before traveling on to the Condenser where it once again becomes liquid and returns to the Feedwater Heaters.

Fuel Pin Leak

Davis-Besse is currently operating with an estimated 2 fuel pin defects. The presence of a fuel defect was first identified on February 25, 2008. Davis-Besse has implemented mitigating actions via the Operational Decision Making Issue (ODMI) for Cycle 16 Fuel Defect Operation. The ODMI makes recommendations for radiochemical analysis and limits on the rate of power changes.

Radiation Protection is monitoring dose rates and has implemented additional shielding in selected areas of the plant to minimize the impact of the affects on personnel exposure.

Additionally, an action plan is under development (with input from the fuel vendor) for remedial actions to be implemented in the Sixteenth Refueling Outage (16RFO) to identify and repair the defective assemblies. The presence of the fuel defects is being successfully managed well within radiochemical limits. For the
2nd Quarter 2008, the peak DEI-131 value was <2% of the regulatory limit with typical values being <1% of the limit. The presence of the fuel defects poses no increased danger to the health and safety of the public under normal operating conditions.

**Perry Nuclear Power Plant**

March 3, 2008 - Fuel Pin Defect

Fuel Pin Defect- updated information from February 28th report that found elevated Xenon-133 and Xenon-135 levels in the Off-Gas system during routine fuel performance monitoring. Based upon current results, Perry is changing its categorization to a “potential defect” rather than a confirmed fuel defect.

Perry Plant staff has revised the fuel defect Operational Decision Making Issue (ODMI) to reflect the results of the suppression testing and the power maneuvers conducted.

Perry Plant staff has relaxed, but did not eliminate, the ramp rate restrictions put in place to avoid stressing and aggravating the fuel defect site during power maneuvers. Some restrictions will be maintained, at least through the summer, to continue to help minimize the stress on the defect’s location while we continue to closely monitor for indications of leakage. Based on having only one sample indicating elevated xenon levels, and cycling the plant through an entire power suppression test and maintenance outage, if no indications of a fuel defect are seen by August 29th, which follows a control rod pattern adjustment on June 28th and 29th, Perry will exit the ODMI and return to normal fuel operating guidance.

April 4, 2008 - Maintenance Outage

The staff completed a planned maintenance outage which substantially improved the health of the Perry Plant. The following items were addressed during the outage:

- Recovery of the "A" hotwell pump by replacing the stem on its discharge valve and verified the other hotwell pump discharge valves were not similarly affected
- Identified and fixed a cracked weld on the 2B main steam reheater level column (future forced de-rate, forced outage avoided)
- Identified and fixed a pin hole leak on an extraction steam drain header (future forced de-rate avoided)
- Identified and fixed several air leaks on the drywell coolers (forced outage avoided)
• Made a number of reactivity control system improvements, including the recovery of control rod 06-47 that had been fully inserted following the power suppression testing performed in March 2008.

• Completed 249 orders during the planned outage versus 159 orders scheduled. Much of the additional work was requested by maintenance to take full advantage of the planned outage window once the repairs to the "A" hotwell pump discharge valve were completed.

• Completed the planned maintenance outage 17 hours ahead of schedule (203 hours versus our plan of 220 hours).

Hazardous Waste Removal

The Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA) conducted a one-day compliance inspection of the Perry Plant on Tuesday, April 15th. The inspection covered the generation and storage of hazardous waste, the storage of universal waste, storage of used oil, and follow-up to the March 31st event where certain waste designated for shipment offsite was found potentially not categorized correctly. The lead inspector stated that there were no violations of EPA rules identified. He commented that the Perry hazardous waste control program is well run and that hazardous waste is being handled and stored properly.

May 14, 2008 and June 7, 2008 Down Power

The Perry Plant staff conducted scheduled down powers for routine monthly turbine valve testing and control rod exercising. These down powers were completed successfully and event-free.

HPCS Inoperable

The High Pressure Core Spray Emergency Service Water System (HPCS ESW-C) was declared inoperable due to a condition that did not allow the subsystem to maintain adequate keep-fill pressure in the event of a loss of offsite power (LOOP). The HPCS ESW "C" Discharge Check Valve was fully rebuilt with new internal parts and the “C” ESW Pump Discharge Valve stops were also reset prior to returning the system to operability.

June 10, 2008 - ERDS out of service

Event of Potential Public Interest notification was made for the planned equipment maintenance; duration minimized by switching to backup power during work on normal power supply. The system was returned on schedule.
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company

Common Dose Assessment Program

An independent study is planned for the second half of 2008 to assess available dose assessment programs. Results and recommendations will be made to the joint State and utility team for selection of the final product. Ohio EMA, State of Pennsylvania, and FENOC have identified the working group members that will review and make the final recommendation. West Virginia will be added to the group to assist making the final selection.

FENOC capital expense committee has been informed that purchase of the software will likely be in the first quarter 2009.

EPPI Procedure

NOP-LP-5003, “Communicating Events of Public Interest” was made effective on June 9, 2008. The procedure provides the fleet expectations and communication flow path to internal and external parties for non-emergency events.

January 31, 2008 - Fermi Scram

At 15:44 hours EST January 31, 2008, the reactor mode switch was taken to shutdown in response to the trip of both reactor recirculation pumps. This inserted a manual reactor scram within 9 seconds of the trip of the recirculation pumps. The reactor protection system (RPS) performed as expected, and all rods were fully inserted into the core. Post scram feedwater logic actuated, as expected. Reactor water level reached a low of approximately 157 inches above top of active fuel and recovered to normal automatically without operator intervention. Subsequent to the event, the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) remained open and reactor water level was maintained in the normal band of 173 to 214 inches. Reactor water was supplied by the condensate and reactor feedwater systems, and the resultant reactor steam was sent to the condenser via the main turbine bypass lines. Pressure control was maintained by the main turbine bypass valves. Reactor dome pressure peaked at about 1077 psig. With reactor pressure maintained below the Safety Relief Valve (SRV) setpoints, none of the SRVs lifted. Reactor water Level 3 isolations occurred as expected. There was no maintenance or testing in progress that would explain the pump trips. No operator performance issues were identified in response to this event.

Subsequent troubleshooting determined the recirculation pump trips were received from the bus undervoltage relay logic. Field investigation determined that the intermittent failure was likely caused by a degraded relay cutoff switch in the undervoltage trip logic. The specific cause, however, could not be identified by failure analysis.
This event posed no significant safety implications because the reactor protection and safety related systems functioned as designed following the manual reactor trip. Therefore health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.

**June 10, 2008 - Fermi Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Unavailable**

The loss of the EOF in June was due to storm activity resulting in a loss of power to the Nuclear Operations Center (training center), where the EOF is located. The emergency diesel for the EOF did not start. No apparent cause was noted. Vendor was contacted and the diesel was tested. No cause for failure to start was determined. The Alternate EOF was available during this time.

**June 13, 2008 – Fermi Unusual Event**

On June 13, 2008, an Unusual Event was declared for an unplanned loss of the Control Room Annunciator system. Specifically, Initiating Condition SU3, “Unplanned Loss of most or all Safety System Annunciation in the Control Room for Greater than 15 minutes”, was met at 0141 and declared by the Shift Manager/Emergency Director at 0146. The loss of annunciators was a result of a failure of a multiplexer cable to the Visual Annunciator System (VAS).

The Control Room crew responded to the event and established increased Control Room and field monitoring. System Engineering personnel were called in to assist restoration of the VAS. No Emergency Response Organization (ERO) members were necessary to augment the Control Room crew.

The Unusual Event was terminated at 6:03 a.m. after the company determined the cause of the event.

**IV. MISCELLANEOUS**

The next meeting of the Utility Radiological Safety Board will be October 14, 2008.

**VI. ADJOURNMENT**

Ms. Dragani asked for a motion to adjourn. Mr. Mitchell moved and Mr. Owen seconded. Motion passed.