

**UTILITY RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY BOARD OF OHIO
MEETING MINUTES
JANUARY 9, 2008**

Chair Nancy Dragani called to order the January 9, 2008 meeting of the Utility Radiological Safety Board of Ohio at 1:30 p.m.

The first order of business was roll call, taken by Ramona Hauenstein.

I. ROLL CALL

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY	MS. NANCY DRAGANI
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH	MR. ROBERT OWEN
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE	MR. ANTHONY MITCHELL
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION	MR. SHAWN SMITH
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY	MS. CINDY HAFNER
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE	MR. DEAN JAGGER

A quorum was declared.

II. READING OF THE OCTOBER 10, 2007 MINUTES (ADOPTED)

The Board dispensed with reading of the October minutes. Ms. Dragani asked for any additions, corrections or deletions to the minutes. Ms. Dragani asked for a motion to approve the minutes. Ms. Cindy Hafner of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) moved to adopt the minutes and Mr. Anthony Mitchell of the Department of Agriculture seconded. The motion was carried.

III. OLD BUSINESS

A. Updated Status of URSB Initiatives

Ms. Carol O'Claire updated the Board on the initiatives led by EMA. The Beaver Valley partial participation exercise is scheduled for June 24, 2008 with the extent of play meeting scheduled on February 6, 2008 at the Columbiana County EOC. The Dry Run will be conducted on June 3, 2008 which will include State Field Monitoring Team participation for training.

The Perry full participation exercise will be conducted on October 7, 2008 with dry run on September 17, 2008. The Reactor Oversight Program continues to be monitored by the Working Group. The current matrix is included in the packet for the meeting.

Mr. Steve Helmer reported for the Department of Health. Mr. Mike Snee is now in charge of the ODH lab and MR. Helmer is acting program director of the Bureau of Radiation Protection. The Working Group is still working on finding between plants.

ODH finally has an agreement with Unescorted Access. Have 2 of 4 employees approved. ODH is be access to the people

The final draft of the KI policy is at the Director's Office for approval.

Mr. Mitchell reported that the Agriculture Brochure has been distributed. Sent to the FSA and 50 mile counties.

Mr. Zack Clayton reported that groundwater report is all the plant.

B. Midwestern Committee Report

Midwestern Committee Meeting

The committee met November 27-29 in Columbus, Ohio. Traditionally, the last meeting of an outgoing co-chair will be held in that person's state. Senator Stephen Buehrer from Ohio attended along with four other legislative members from Kansas, Wisconsin, Indiana, and Iowa. Dr. Alvin Jackson, Director of Health, welcomed participants to Ohio. Representatives from industry, DOE, NRC, and other regional groups also attended the meeting. A tour of the DOE Portsmouth facility near Piketon, Ohio was conducted on the 29th. The following are the key issues addressed at the meeting.

Section 180(c) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act

As reported to this board at the last meeting, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) published its revised proposed policy to set forth its revised plans for implementing Section 180(c) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) of 1982 in the Federal Register, dated July 23, 2007. This section requires DOE to provide technical and financial assistance for training public safety officials to states and Indian tribes through whose jurisdictions the DOE plans to transport spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste to a facility authorized under Section A or C of the NWPA. The training is to cover both safe routine transportation and emergency response procedures.

The committee submitted its comments on the proposed policy to DOE on October 9, 2007. A brief discussion of the comments was provided in the last report to the URSB. Three key recommendations were funding the same transportation programs as was done for the WIPP campaigns, capturing the policy eventually in rule, and allowing for contingency re-routing.

As also previously reported, DOE also solicited comments from the governor of each affected state. ODH, OEMA, and PUCO developed specific comments for forwarding by Governor Strickland, who responded to DOE on November 30, 2007. Ohio's comments were in line with those of the Midwestern Committee. We did emphasize leaving funding distributions up to states, the need for additional information for funding assessments, and continuation of funding during years with no shipments.

Security

The four state regional groups drafted a matrix of security information for consideration by NRC for sharing of information with the states regarding package performance. This was a direct result of a letter from the committee to the NRC in 2006. While the Chair of the NRC was receptive to working with the states on doing so, no action has been taken by the NRC toward that end. Thus, a letter was sent to the NRC on October 15, 2007, formalizing our request for discussing next steps toward accomplishing this cooperation.

Routing Topic Group

The Midwestern Committee continues to be an active member of the DOE TEC/WG Routing Topic Group. The Midwest's development of a proposed suite of routes was presented at the committee meeting. A task plan for the group has been proposed. It pushes for greater interaction among participants on an ongoing basis toward identification of a national suite of routes to Yucca Mountain.

Yucca SEIS

DOE has issued a Draft Repository Environmental Impact Statement (DREIS) dealing with a variety of issues related to transportation. The committee responded to the DREIS requesting that DOE hold at least two public meetings in the Midwest. These should be along major potential shipping routes. Since over 9000 shipments of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste will traverse the country, most heading through the Midwestern states, it was felt that an open forum was needed to encourage the exchange of information and ideas. DOE is recognizing "social risk" as a factor for consideration in their planning process.

Future Meetings

The next meeting of the committee will probably be in Rapid City, South Dakota during the Midwestern Legislative Conference (July 13-16, 2008). If this time slot doesn't work out, the backup plan is to have the meeting in Indianapolis, IN during the week of June 16.

IV. NEW BUSINESS

A. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Representative Dennis Kucinich has requested that he be briefed on the special report before. The report should be done later this month or early February.

Ms. Dragani asked Ms. O'Claire to send out the survey to Board and .

November 9 Public Meeting

November 9 Conference call. NEI NRC and FEMA. FEMA transportation

The NRC is holding 3 public meetings throughout country on how to revise rules on Radioactive Material Quantity of Concern (RMCQ). They will be held:

January 15 at 12:30 to 4:30 p.m. in Lisle, IL,
January 17 in CA.
January 23

- B. November 9, 2007 Meeting on Security Based EP Drills
- C. Utility Reports

Beaver Valley Power Station

Unit 1 Refueling Outage

The Unit 1 1R18 outage commenced on September 24th at 0001 hours and ended on October 24th, 2007 at 2213 hours. The outage was completed in 30 days and 22 hours. (second shortest duration for a Unit 1 refueling outage.

Failure of the spent fuel side up-ender cable and the subsequent fuel replacement for the impacted fuel assembly affected the schedule by 98 hours. The containment sump and weld overlay projects were completed as intended during the outage.

The replacement steam generators, atmospheric containment and integrated reactor head during the previous outage were significant beneficial factors in the dose reduction, duration and outage cost improvements noted during 1R18.

The outage exposure and PCEs (personnel contamination events) were the lowest in Unit 1 outage history at 85.8 rem and 33 PCEs respectively. This moved Unit 1 from the Industry 4th quartile to the 2nd quartile for collective radiation exposure.

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

Independent Assessments

As part of the NRC confirmatory order related to the Davis-Besse reactor vessel head degradation event, Davis-Besse is committed to performing independent assessment of four key programs for a period of five years (2004-2008)

Three of the four independent assessments scheduled for 2007 have been completed and results presented during the October 2007 Utility Radiological

Safety Board meeting. These assessment covered Operations Performance, Corrective Action Program, and Engineering Program.

The Safety Culture and Safety Conscious Work Environment independent assessment site employee survey was completed in September and an on-site assessment conducted in November. The assessment identified no Areas for Improvement, several Areas of Strength, Areas in Need of Attention and Opportunities for Improvement. The results of the workforce survey indicate that all major cultural components are Highly Effective and place Davis-Besse site within the top quartile of the sites included in the consultant's current industry database. Final report is scheduled to be issued to the NRC at the end of the month.

The 2008 Confirmatory Order Independent Assessments schedule is as follows:

2008 CONFIRMATORY ORDER INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT SCHEDULE					
Tentative					
ASSESSMENT	SUBMIT PLAN	CONDUCT ASSESSMENT	EXIT & DRAFT REPORT TO DB	FINAL REPORT TO DB	FINAL REPORT TO NRC
Operations Performance	February 12	May 12 – May 23	June 6	June 13	July 21
Corrective Action Program	April 8	July 7 - July 18	August 1	August 8	September 12
Engineering Program Effectiveness	June 24	Sept. 22 – October 3	October 17	October 24	December 1
2008 Safety Culture/SCWE	June 6	9/4 – 9/20 Survey 10/27- 10/31 On site	December 5	December 12	January 19, 2009

15th Refueling Outage (Weld overlays)

Outage scheduled duration is planned for approximately 33days. The outage commenced on December 30, 2007 with the main generator taken offline.

In addition to refueling and turbine/generator work during 1R15 the scope of activities includes performing repairs to sixteen Alloy 600 connections.

Internationally since the 1980's, there have been cases of Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) of Alloy 600 nozzles and penetration in Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR) primary system pressure boundaries. Cases have been cited in Sweden, Japan, and the United States.

The industry Materials Reliability Program (MRP) -139, Primary System Piping Weld Inspection and Evaluation Guideline was issued in 2005. Inspection has become a Mandatory program under Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 03-08, Guideline for the Management of Materials Issues.

The program provides guidance for volumetric and visual inspection of specific configuration alloy welds in PWR reactor coolant systems.

The program established Pressurizer weld locations as the first priority followed by Hot Leg and then Cold Leg welds. Davis-Besse's inspection/mitigation timeline is as follows:

December 31, 2007 – Pressurizer
December 31, 2008 – Hot Legs
December 31, 2010 – Cold legs

In early 2007 FENOC had developed a plan to perform inspections and weld overlays during this refueling outage. One of the actions was to advance start of the current refueling outage from February 2008 to December 2007.

Early on the morning of January 4, welding technicians were conducting robotic welding on the decay heat removal system suction connection to the reactor coolant system. While applying a weld overlay, technicians noticed water seeping from a freshly applied weld on the 12 inch diameter, 1.5 inch thick pipe. The pipe carries heated water from the reactor vessel through the decay heat removal coolers while the reactor is shutdown. There was not indication of seepage during plant operations or during the boric acid control walk downs.

The team is conducting ultrasonic testing of the pipe to characterize the indication and has contacted industry experts from the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) and Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO).

Repair options are under review for the decay heat removal suction line weld and a determination of changes to the inspection scope based upon the information gathered from the decay heat drop line weld.

Alert Notification System Report

The Davis Besse Prompt Notification System (sirens) Final Design Report was approved on October 17, 2007 by Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/ Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). This Final Design Report included the upgrade (replacement of older to current model) of the 54 sirens located in the Davis-Besse 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), their associated control stations, and the relocation of two sirens. DHS/FEMA stated the Davis Besse Prompt Notification System meets the applicable guidance of FEMA-REP-10 and NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, as applied to fixed sirens used for primary alerting.

Additionally, the 54 sirens within the Davis Besse EPZ have been upgraded to include back-up battery operation.

Radioactive material found along railroad section (onsite)

Radioactive Material (RM) was discovered outside the Radiological Controlled Area (RCA), but within the protected area. The RM was located in gravel in the vicinity of the railroad tracks at the first double fence coming out of the turbine building on the north side of the plant.

The consequences are minimal due to the RM being controlled in a restricted area and the area is infrequently accessed. Additionally, the contamination was fixed and low activity.

Analysis of the identified nuclides determined that the contamination occurred approximately 14-16 years ago (between October 1991- October 1993).

Surveys have been conducted of the protected area north, south, and west of the plant and no further contamination has been discovered.

Surveys were performed of the following areas:

- rail bed and stone 6 feet from rail centerline to the protected area fence (no positive count rates above background),
- rail track area from the turbine building track bay roll up door to interface with stone bed (results slightly above background, 50-120 corrected counts per minute),
- portions of the road between the dry fuel storage pad and the low level radwaste building (no RAM Identified)
- accessible area on the dry fuel storage pad (no RAM identified)
- turbine rotors (no RAM identified on the train cars, gravel under rotors, or rotor covers),
- travel path between Turbine Rotors and Protected Area fence located south east of the rotors (no RAM identified).

A historic review of Condition Reports was conducted and there were no other incidents of this type since 2000 (the limit of the CR Database).

There are no other areas that have obvious similar conditions as evidenced by the extent of condition surveys north, south, and west of the plant performed as a result of locating the contaminated gravel.

The cause of the contamination was not able to be determined due to the length of time from when the contamination was believed to have occurred.

The dirt was removed to a depth of 15 inches and the area surveyed. The area was surveyed with a frisker and readings were background levels. The dirt was stored in a container and the evacuated area has been filled with different dirt. These actions were completed by December 14, 2007.

Protected Access Facility evacuation November 16, 2007

At 1010 hours the entrance search officer, located on the first floor on the Primary Access Facility (PAF), was processing a station mail delivery through the search train equipment. During this process he identified a suspicious package on his video monitor. He immediately contacted his supervisor to get a peer check of the image that was present. The supervisor concurred with his assessment of a suspicious looking package and implemented the appropriate immediate actions and established compensatory measures (specific compensatory measures are Safeguards Information).

Notifications to the Local Law Enforcement Agency (LLEA) and the Operations Shift Manager were also completed in a timely manner. Individuals working on the second floor of the PAF were notified of the situation and evacuated to a safe distance. Walking areas around the building were also monitored and individuals were kept out of the general area. During this period of time, a Site Protection staff member met with the mail delivery personnel to determine which of the packages they had delivered may contain items similar to the image on the monitor. The information gained by speaking to the mail delivery personnel enabled the Site Protection staff member to determine who shipped the package, the size and contents of the package and the individual on site that was expecting the package.

The staff member then called the site employee who was expecting the package to independently verify the information previously obtained. The site employee independently verified the shipping vendor, the size of the package and provided a detailed description of what the contents would look like as viewed on a monitor. Based on the information and description gained through the investigation, the Site Protection Section personnel had a high assurance that the package did not contain any malicious material.

The Site Protection Manager then opened the package and verified the contents that were expected for plant equipment. Site Protection secured from the incident and made the appropriate notifications. Normal activities were restored at 1042 hours.

The sequence of events was handled appropriately in accordance with security procedures.

Perry Nuclear Power Plant

October 13 & 14 – Plant down powers

- Plant downpower due to Reactor Feed Pump Turbine (RFPT) Lube Oil filter differential pressure increasing.

Reactor Feedpump Turbine(RFPT) B lube oil filter differential pressure increase.

Following a RFPT B lube oil pump shift, lube oil filter differential pressure increased approximately 3 psid over a two hour period, to 8 psid. Over the next four hours pressure increased another 0.5 psid, (currently 8.5). Prior to the lube oil pump shift, differential pressure was approximately 5 psid. The action required shifting the in-service filter and replacing the filter and was accomplished during the plant down power on October 13, 2007. The apparent cause is lube oil contaminants caused by water intrusion aggravated by the loss of purifier operation for extended periods of time.

- Plant downpower due to feedwater heater #4 isolation and entry into off normal instruction.

Heater #4 Level High alarm was received. The crew entered the Off Normal Instruction for a loss of feedwater heating and reduced Reactor power to 95% per the instruction. The hot surge tank (HST) Level Control Valve PY-1N21F0230 drifted open causing an increase in HST Level. The repair activities identified an audible air leak internal to the valve actuator positioner. Removal of the positioner cover identified the upper piston pneumatic relay was leaking air from the exhaust. De-pressurization of the upper side of the actuator piston caused the valve to drift open and have a delayed response to a 'close' controller signal. HST level was controlled in manual until repairs were completed.

Plant Shutdown due to digital feedwater power supply failure

On November 28, 2007 at 0732 with the plant at 100% power, a plant scram occurred due to a main turbine trip signal initiated from the Digital Feedwater Control system (high reactor water level). A failure of the Digital Feedwater Control (DFWC) power supply was identified as the cause initiating the event. High Pressure Core Spray initiated to restore Reactor Water Level.

During the plant scram, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) tripped twice due to low pump suction pressure. Instrument venting and controller tuning were identified as causes for the system trip. The final report is in progress.

Contraband found – December 5, 2007

Plant Security screening identified contraband within an employee's personal bag at the plant access facility. The employee's access is restricted while plant and local law enforcement investigation is completed. The contraband was identified by a security officer performing his duties at X-ray search during routine processing of an individual into the plant. Officers working X-ray search performed all the proper actions with regard to this incident. The individual at no time made entry into the Protected Area.

Secondary Containment Integrity Technical Specification action entry

On December 21, 2007, Annulus Exhaust Gas Treatment System (AEGTS) 'A' train was removed from service for planned maintenance earlier in the day.

AEGTS 'B' train was in service when a low annulus differential pressure alarm was received. The 'B' recirculation damper was found full closed and the exhaust damper was in an intermediate position with the annulus differential pressure low. The exhaust damper for AEGTS train B was stuck at a mid position and would not open to allow exhaust flow to stabilize the annulus differential pressure. Later troubleshooting found that both the recirculation and discharge hydromotor had failed. Since the 'A' train was inoperable for maintenance (charcoal sample), an inoperable train 'B' required entry into Technical Specification action for plant shutdown or restore AEGTS train 'A' to operable status and repairs made to both 'B' train dampers. The "A" train was recovered; therefore, plant shutdown was not required.

FENOC

Siren update

The FENOC siren testing performance indicators for the three plants are as follows (percentages are a measure of the success rate of siren performance during tests as described in the FEMA approves siren design reports):

- Davis-Besse 99.75%
- Perry 99.34%
- Beaver Valley 99.34%

During 2007, the 26 remaining Davis-Besse sirens were upgraded with battery backup to AC power. All 54 sirens for the 10-mile radius emergency planning zone are equipped with battery backup power.

During 2007, 19 of the Beaver Valley sirens were upgraded with replacement sirens that also included battery backup. Current overall status of the 120 sirens is that 25 sirens have been upgraded to include battery backup and 26 sirens are modified to add battery backup in the future.

Groundwater Protection Update

As previously reported, all the wells have been sampled and reporting of the Davis-Besse results were completed in accordance with the communications plan. No samples are scheduled until later in 2008.

The final report for each site from Environmental Resource Management is due by the end of this month. Final comments are being incorporated. URSB requested copies of this report and they will be provided through OEMA when we receive them.

A procedure that includes the action points that would require communications has been completed. It will be issued in late March. The existing process for sampling and reporting will remain in place until then; however, no samples are scheduled for the winter months.

Fermi Notice of Unusual Event – October 11, 2007 (possible security event)

URSB Statutory Minutes
January 8, 2007

On October 11, 2007, during a refueling outage, personnel at Fermi Unit 2 discovered a small unexpected hole and several indentations on steam line pipes. The small hole went all the way through the pipe; the indentations were of varying depths. The plant was in a shutdown condition for refueling. Appropriate safety systems were available and the plant was in a safe condition. Under certain conditions, which were not present, these pipes are used to relieve reactor pressure. Even if they had to be used to relieve reactor pressure, there would have been no radiation released to the environment.

The utility conducted an investigation into the cause of the damage to the pipes. Tampering was considered as one of the potential causes of the holes and indentations. This led the utility to declare an Unusual Event.

Based on interviews and reviews of maintenance activities, the utility's conclusion was the damage occurred during the removal of pipe insulation. The event was exited when it was concluded this was not a malicious act.

Preliminary Results of the 2007 Emergency Planning Audit

The Nuclear Oversight organization is conducting an audit of FENOC Emergency Preparedness to determine compliance with federal requirements within the Code of Federal Regulations. The audit will review the programs at the three plants. The Davis-Besse and Perry portions of the audit are completed with the Beaver Valley portion to be conducted this week.

The Audit Team conducted interviews of State and County EMA officials for the purpose of determining the adequacy of the interface between the plants and State and County EMA organizations. The results of the interviews, to date, indicated adequate communications/interface between the organizations.

The audit exit is tentatively scheduled for January 30, 2008.

V. MISCELLANEOUS

The next meeting of the Utility Radiological Safety Board will be April 7, 2008.

VI. ADJOURNMENT