UTILITY RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY BOARD OF OHIO
MEETING MINUTES
April 11, 2011

Ms. Nancy Dragani, Ohio Emergency Management Agency, called to order the April 11, 2011 meeting of the Utility Radiological Safety Board of Ohio at 1:00 p.m.

Guests:
Mr. Greg Halmon, First Energy Nuclear Operating Company, was introduced.
Mr. Fred Cayia, First Energy Nuclear Operating Company, was introduced.
Mr. Glenn McKee, First Energy Nuclear Operating Company, was introduced.
Mr. Rick Collings, First Energy Nuclear Operating Company, was introduced.

The first order of business from the agenda was the roll call taken by the URSB Secretary, Tess Pelfrey.

I. ROLL CALL

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<tr>
<th>EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY</th>
<th>MS. NANCY DRAGANI</th>
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<tr>
<td>DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH</td>
<td>MR. STEVE HELMER</td>
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<td>DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE</td>
<td>MR. CHUCK KIRCHNER</td>
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<td>PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION</td>
<td>MR. DANIEL FISHER</td>
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<td>ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY</td>
<td>MR. KEVIN CLOUSE</td>
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<td>DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE</td>
<td>NO REPRESENTATIVE</td>
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A quorum was declared.

II. READING OF THE OCTOBER 12, 2010 MINUTES (ADOPTED)

The Board dispensed with reading of the October 12, 2010 minutes. Ms. Dragani asked for any additions, corrections or deletions to the minutes. Ms. Dragani asked for a motion to approve the minutes. Mr. Dan Fisher of PUCO (Public Utilities Commission of Ohio) moved to adopt the minutes and Mr. Chuck Kirchner of the Ohio Department of Agriculture (ODA) seconded. The motion was carried.

III. OLD BUSINESS

A. Midwestern Committee Report

Mr. Dan Fisher of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio stated that Carlisle Smith, the URSB’s representative to the Midwestern Committee, prepared the Midwestern Report of the meeting held December 7, 2010. He directed the Board members to the report and offered to answer any questions. He stated there will be a Midwestern Committee meeting held in May in Denver, CO. PUCO, ODH and possibly a representative from EMA will be present.

Ms. Dragani asked if there were any questions. Mr. Zack Clayton, Ohio Environmental Protection Agency, stated that he heard that there might be training coming up for the transportation campaign. He asked if there were any specifics of who would be given the training and where the training would be held. Mr. Fisher replied that he did not have any specifics, but hopefully, he would know more after the May meeting.
Council of State Governments  
Midwestern Radioactive Materials Transportation Committee  
Fall meeting, Milwaukee, WI, December 7-8, 2010

• Lisa Janairo reported that DOE Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) has provided most of the anticipated funding for the FYF. Because CBFO has been working under a continuing resolution, a delay in the releasing all of the funding has occurred. More pressing, the full amount of CBFO funding for states agreements had not been obligated, which may interfere with the state’s ability to prepare for shipments;
• Lisa Janairo reported that she will be seeking new gubernatorial and legislative appointees to the committee. This process will begin in January 2011;
• Lisa Janairo encouraged members to review the transportation issues archive which is found on the CSG Midwest website. The site includes hyperlinks to electronic copies of past reports;
• Kevin Leurer (Minnesota) reported on activities of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Rulemaking Review work group. The workgroup submitted comments on the NRC’s Part 37 rulemaking (physical protection of byproduct materials). The workgroup has also held a conference call to review the NRC’s NPR on Part 73 for physical protection of spent fuel shipments. The workgroup did not have take issue with the NPRM therefore no comments are to be submitted;
• Tim Runyon (Illinois) reported on the activities of the National Transportation Stakeholders Forum (NTSF). The NTSF replaces the old Transportation External Coordination Working Group. The NTSF created four ad hoc working groups:
  o Financial guidance for states and tribes receiving WIPP funding;
  o Improvements to DOE Prospective Shipments Reports (PSR);
  o Notification issues for states and tribes;
  o Improving communications;
• Carlisle Smith (Ohio) updated the Committee on the reciprocal rail inspection program working group. The goal is create an inspection program similar to the CVSA “enhanced” radioactive materials inspection program. A working inspection form was tested in Ohio in September 2010 with Ohio HM rail inspectors and FRA HM Inspectors. The working group is waiting feedback on the inspection form from the state rail safety programs. It was agreed that a shipping campaign needs to be found to pilot test the new inspection form. Mr. Smith also noted that funding would be necessary to successfully administer a pilot inspection program.
• Jenifer Clark (Kansas) reported on the Committee’s Information and Communications work group. The work group recently updated the “Planning Guide for Shipments of Radioactive Material through Midwestern States”. The group also distributed a “Fee states flyer” in December.
• An update of the Fee States Caucus was given. The group holds conference calls quarterly to provide updates on the issues and experiences of the Midwestern states who apply fees to HRCQ of radioactive materials.
• Tim Runyon and Lisa Janairo participated in the November 2nd meeting of the Transportation and Storage Subcommittee of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future. Mr. Runyon shared information on Illinois’s experiences with low level waste storage and shipment planning.
• Tim Runyon was elected to be the new co-chair of the Midwestern Committee;

State Roundtable
• Minnesota stated that they have observed a significant increase in the number of HRCQ shipments of CO-60, believed to be a direct result of the carrier’s avoiding the fee states along the I-80 and I-70 corridor. In the past Minnesota would experience 1-2 shipments of CO-60 a
year. This past year they have seen up to 3-4 shipments per month. Minnesota is looking at the impacts of the increase shipments what measures they may take to respond to the additional shipments. Two additional Level VI trained inspectors have been added to Minnesota’s motor carrier enforcement program to handle the increase number of HRCQ shipments;

- Kansas has a new governor for 2011. Kansas had only one HRCQ shipment in CY 2010;
- Missouri is working on regulations to clarify some of the issues caused by the state’s radioactive materials fee law. Missouri did not have one HRCQ shipment in CY 2010;
- Michigan stated that the number of HRCQ shipments in CY 2010 is 50% less than CY 2009. Michigan continues to shy away from fees, partly due to the economy of the state. The Michigan DOT has contracted with Battelle Columbus to review the hazmat routing around the Detroit metro area. There is a growing desire to privatize the Ambassador Bridge therefore the routing of HM around the bridge has been questioned;
- Illinois conducted 70 inspections in CY 2010, with only 7 being spent fuel, the rest were WIPP related or CO-60 shipments;
- Nebraska granted the WIPP shipments an exemption from the state’s fees based on the shipments being legacy waste from the cold war;
- Ohio’s Department of Health is experiencing a large number of retirements which is having a direct impact on the Agencies institutional knowledge of RAM transportation related issues. OEMA hosted a TRANS COM Superuser training this past fall. The number of CO-60 shipments had dropped significantly since Ohio’s fees were implemented in 2009;
- Wisconsin stated that the were also seeing an increase in the number of CO-60 shipments traveling south from Minnesota;
- Iowa stated that most of the shipments through their state were WIPP related originating in Illinois.

Updates were given by FMCSA, US DOE office of Environmental Management, US DOE CBFO (WIPP), CVSA, US DOE MERRITT Responder Training, FRA Shortline Railroad Infrastructure review, Nuclear Energy Institute Perspectives, Private Fuel Storage LLC, US NRC and the NPRM for security for Spent Fuel (Part 73) and for security for By product materials (Part 37).

B. Updated Status of URSB Initiatives

Ms. Carol O’Claire, Ohio EMA, reviewed the URSB Initiatives.

PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT PARTIAL PARTICIPATION EXERCISE

The 2010 PNPP partial participation exercise was conducted on September 28, 2010. Preliminary findings include one ARCA for the state of Ohio under Criterion 5.b.1, “Offsite Response Organizations provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner.” The counties of Lake, Ashtabula, and Geauga did not receive any FEMA findings. Received the final PNPP After Action Report / Improvement Plan in February, 2011. The state received a planning issue under Criteria 2.b.1 Field Monitoring Teams coordination. The ARCA was verbally rescinded by FEMA in mid December.

DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION EXERCISE

The DBNPS partial participation exercise will be conducted on May 10, 2011. The dry run was conducted on April 5, 2011. The FMT drill was held on April 4, 2011.
AFTER ACTION PLAN ACTIVITIES (EMA/ODA/ODH/EPA)

Individual agencies continue to address issues noted from the previous nuclear power plant exercises including revisions to the state REP plan. Where appropriate the working group combines repeat issues or issues of a similar nature into one action item to be addressed. After Action issues are being addressed by e-mail with periodic meetings as necessary. After Action items from the September 2010 Perry Exercise critique have been added to the After Action Matrix. A letter was sent to FENOC requesting assistance to resolve outstanding FENOC related issues. A conference call was conducted with FENOC to resolve some of the issues and the After Action Matrix was updated accordingly. The next After Action meeting will be held following the Davis-Besse 2011 exercise and quarterly thereafter.

IZRRAG ACTIVITIES (ODH/EMA/EPA/ODA)

IZRRAG training and drills will continue to be conducted annually. IZRRAG training was conducted on October 18, 2010. An IZRRAG drill to include the Field Team Center/Sample Screening Point activities was conducted on October 27, 2010. An IZRRAG Tabletop drill was conducted on November 10, 2010. The next evaluated ingestion exercise for the State will be in 2012 with the Perry plant. The 2011 IZRRAG training is under development.

REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROGRAM (EMA/ODH)

This is an NRC program used to provide continuous oversight of nuclear power plants to verify that each plant is operated in accordance with NRC rules and regulations. Key features of the program are a risk-informed regulatory framework, risk-informed inspections, a significance determination process to evaluate inspection findings, performance indicators, a streamlined assessment process, and more clearly defined actions the NRC will take for plants based on their performance. The URSB will continue to monitor this program especially as it relates to emergency preparedness.

a. DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION (DBNPS):

Davis-Besse transitioned to column one of the NRC Reactor Oversight Matrix due to the closure of the White Finding as described in NRC Inspection Report No. 0500346/2010502 as of December 28, 2010.

Davis-Besse received the replacement head on November 29, 2010. The working group will request JIOPs to observe the reactor head evolutions.

Davis-Besse has submitted an application to the NRC for a 20-year license renewal. The Atomic Safety Licensing Board (ASLB) hearing was conducted on March 1, 2011. The working group is monitoring the issue.

b. BEAVER VALLEY NUCLEAR POWER STATION

Beaver Valley continues to be in column one of the NRC Reactor Oversight Matrix.

c. PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

The Perry plant continues to be in column one of the NRC Reactor Oversight Matrix.

TECHNOLOGY (EMA/ODH/EPA)
The Working Group had previously determined the need for consistent plant data in the Assessment Room. FENOC attended the Beaver Valley 2006 exercise to evaluate state dose assessment needs. Beaver Valley has real time e-data available, but currently there is no simulator e-data link from Beaver Valley to the state EOC. The Beaver Valley simulator e-data link was projected to be operational before the exercise dry run in March 2010, but was unavailable. The e-data system was successfully utilized during the 2010 dry run and evaluated exercise with the PNPP. The e-data system has not been completed for the Davis-Besse plant.

Ten piezoelectric dosimeter chargers were received in SFY 2011. Additional instrumentation will be purchased once the next grant agreement with FENOC is negotiated.

FMT air sampling equipment from Radeco Corporation has been received and will replace the older air sampling units. Training and incorporation of the new air samplers into the FMT procedures are currently in process.

STATE DOSE ASSESSMENT (ODH/EMA)

In 2007, a working group of utility and state agencies was initiated for the evaluation of available dose assessment software. The last meeting was conducted on August 26, 2009 to discuss a common dose assessment program. No meetings are currently scheduled to further discuss development of the program.

FENOC has chosen MIDAS as their dose assessment program. ODH and EMA will undertake a reevaluation of RASCAL 4.0. It is felt that RASCAL is a viable alternative to explore.

KI (ODH/EMA)

The replacement of KI will be addressed in 2014.

REP GUIDANCE AND NRC RULEMAKING (ALL)

The NRC and FEMA released draft documents for public comment regarding radiological emergency preparedness. The comment period closed October 19, 2009. The Board submitted comments to FEMA for consideration. FEMA has developed draft Impact Papers. State of Ohio has submitted comments to National Emergency Management Association (NEMA). The draft Impact Papers were discussed at the January 27, 2011 NEPAC meeting. URSB Working Group members were in attendance. The NRC and FEMA are planning public workshops to discuss the implementation of FEMA guidance and NRC rules following finalization of rules.

Efforts continue with the improvement of the Ohio Plan for Response to Radiation Emergencies at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants with regard to NIMS compliance. Ohio EMA will continue to revise the plan in accordance with NIMS requirements as inconsistencies are discovered. The above mentioned Impact Papers address the inconsistencies between NUREG-0654 and NIMS.

The Working Group has been advised that additional ICS training is needed to ensure EOC staff meets NIMS criteria. ODH held ICS-300 training in the first quarter of 2011. ODA has scheduled ICS-400 training for May 24-25, 2011. These trainings are available to all URSB agencies.

PROCEDURAL REVIEW (ALL)
The Working Group continues to review procedures to ensure consistency among member agencies. The emergency phase procedure review has been completed.

**PROCEDURES REVIEW COMPLETED**

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<tr>
<th>State Assessment Room</th>
<th>Field Operations</th>
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<tr>
<td>Dose Assessment Group Supervisor</td>
<td>Field Monitoring Team Coordinator</td>
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<td>Dose Assessment Unit Leader</td>
<td>Field Monitoring Team Members</td>
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<td>Dose Assessment QA Systems Operator</td>
<td>Field Monitoring Team Courier</td>
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<td>State Dose Assessment Systems Operator</td>
<td>Dosimetry Coordinator</td>
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<td>Formal Line Communicator</td>
<td>Sample Screening Point</td>
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<td>Informal Line Communicator</td>
<td>JIC Liaison</td>
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<td>County EOC Liaison</td>
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<td>Utility EOF Liaison</td>
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<td>Field Monitoring Team Communicator</td>
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<td>Assessment Branch Director</td>
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<td>Assessment Support Unit Leader</td>
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<td>Executive Group Liaison</td>
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The next set of procedures to be reviewed will be those concerning IZRRAG.

**AGRICULTURE BROCHURE (ODA)**

The agriculture brochure has been updated and distributed to businesses and farms within a 10-mile radius of the nuclear power plants. The brochure can be found on the ODA and EMA websites.

**JOINT INSPECTION OBSERVATION PROGRAM (ALL)**

**JIOP INSPECTIONS**

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<th>JIOP Number</th>
<th>Date(s)</th>
<th>Inspection</th>
<th>Agency</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010-DBNPS-07</td>
<td>November 15-19, 2010</td>
<td>Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment and Reactor Coolant System Activity</td>
<td>ODH</td>
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<td>2010-DBNPS-08</td>
<td>December 1-3, 2010</td>
<td>Follow-up Supplement Inspection</td>
<td>OEMA</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010-DBNPS-09</td>
<td>December 13-17, 2010</td>
<td>Radiological Hazard Assessment &amp; Exposure Controls, Occupational ALARA Planning &amp; Controls, Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness, and Verification of Licensee Responses</td>
<td>ODH</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011-DBNPS-01</td>
<td>January 24-28, 2011</td>
<td>Radiation Protection</td>
<td>ODH</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011-BVPS-01</td>
<td>March 21-25, 2011</td>
<td>Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls, Occupational</td>
<td>ODH</td>
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Director Dragani stated that she had a couple of things of note for the Board. The Perry Nuclear Power Plant exercise is a partial-participation exercise. The state of Ohio barely escaped an ARCA at the last exercise because of the Joint Information Center and the way our PIO coordinated with the plant and with the media. Director Dragani stated that she is significantly concerned about the way we exercise public information. It is artificial and unrealistic in today’s climate and we need to take a strong look at the way we handle public information at the nuclear power plants. Ms. O’Claire has mentioned this to FENOC and we are in the process of identifying one of our partner states in Region V and taking a field trip to their JIC during an exercise to see how another state handles public information during an exercise. The state of Michigan manages the JIC. Director Dragani wanted make it aware that this is something that the state is working on and that we are trying to make the public information and JIC concept more realistic.

Mr. Kevin Clouse asked which state we were thinking of visiting. She replied that she does not think we will be able to go to Michigan, so it might be the plant in Illinois that is on the border of Illinois and Indiana. Michigan’s exercise was in March, so we just missed that. She does not want to wait and wants to move forward and visit a plant in Region V. Region III operates so differently. Mr. Helmer asked when we are planning on visiting. Ms. Dragani said she does not know and we need to identify the exercise.

Director Dragani asked Ms. O’Claire about the procedure review and who reviewed the JIC liaison procedures. Ms. O’Claire deferred to Mr. Mike Bear, Radiological Analyst Supervisor, and he stated that the position was Ohio Department of Health’s JIC liaison, not the EMA JIC procedures. Mr. Helmer stated that would be specific to their staffing and Mr. Bear replied that it was their subject matter expert, not the actual PIO.

Director Dragani then asked regarding IZRRAG activities-how difficult would it be to get federal play at the next ingestion exercise? It would be beneficial to know what FEMA would actually do and what will ANI would actually do. Mr. Barker stated that it would be best for Ms. O’Claire to go through him and he can try to find out who the best point of contact is. Ms. O’Claire stated we have submitted a letter to Mr. Bill King asking for federal involvement and asking for the outreach program that they usually provide ahead of an ingestion exercise. The last time we did that, part of the outreach was a table top exercise for Beaver Valley Power Station; that would be very beneficial. Mr. Barker stated that would be the standard. He said to give him the scope and he would go from there. Director Dragani said we did the table top for the Beaver Valley Power Station exercise, but they are so atypical, since it is a different region and different state, that it would be beneficial to have involvement from our FEMA region.

IV. NEW BUSINESS

A. Quarterly Reports

Director Dragani asked Ms. O’Claire to state why we have a new item added to the agenda-the Quarterly Reports-and why this was somewhat at Director Dragani’s request. Ms. O’Claire stated that we certainly appreciate FENOC coming down to attend the board meeting. This is an oversite board and we want to hear what is going on with the plants, but more importantly, there is a “state” piece to the board too. Adding Quarterly Reports to the agenda is an attempt to make the state issue more prevalent to the Board and to allow the URSB Working Group members to brief what is happening in their respective state
agencies regarding the nuclear power plants. Director Dragani also said this is an attempt to make the meeting more "value-added," -is this good the way it is, or are there discussion topics or elements that we should be talking about that we are not because we got into a two hour schedule and do not want the meeting to go longer. Her intention was not to put another requirement on the WG-it was really to make sure if we are spending two hours together every quarter, that it is the most productive two hours we can make it on this topic. The intent is for each agency to go over their report.

PUCO did not provide a report because there was nothing of note this quarter, besides the Midwestern Committee report, which was already covered, and Commerce is not represented.

Ohio Department of Agriculture

Mr. Chuck Kirchner provided the Ohio Department of Agriculture’s Quarterly Report. Aside from attending the monthly working group meetings, Agriculture has recently been involved with the Japanese situation and answering questions regarding food imports from Japan. The media has not helped with their reports about Iodine-131 found in rainwater around the country. ODA works closely with FDA and they monitor food imports. Approximately 4% of the food imported from Japan is seafood, snack food and processed fruits and vegetables. The FDA has a Food Import System in place that tracks all the food coming in to the country. Those firms outside the United States have to be registered with the FDA and when they are shipping to the United States, they have to let the FDA know to expect an upcoming shipment. In this case, they are paying a lot of attention of what is coming in from Japan. The FDA is working closely with Custom and Border Protection to share resources and techniques for measuring radiation. In Ohio, the U.S. EPA sends sample containers to the dairy division on quarterly basis and collect milk in two parts of the state and ship to Montgomery, Alabama for radiological testing. Because of the events in Japan and Iodine-131, they have ramped up testing. ODA has been getting calls from consumers. One concern is with leafy vegetables that come in from Arizona and California and if the vegetables are ok to eat. ODA continues to monitor the situation.

Ohio Emergency Management Agency

Ms. O’Claire wanted to make sure everyone knew there was a change in administration-Mr. Tom Charles is the new Director of Public Safety. He used to be Ohio Inspector General.

The Perry Nuclear Power Plant ARCA has already been discussed. There is more detail contained in the Quarterly Report on the ARCA. The counties also incurred some ARCAAs that were re-demonstrated on the spot. There were also a few planning issues.

The Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station exercise was covered in the initiatives. Waterway clearance with will be done out-of-sync on May 11 with ODNR, Division of Watercraft. Waterway clearance is very important to state of Ohio and FEMA wanted to see a demonstration of this.

An EPZ Training Working Group was put together with representatives from state agencies, counties and the utility. The group worked to compile standardized training objectives for workers, which will be implemented this year. The group is planning on meeting mid-year to see how process is going and see if any modules would need to be tweaked. Thank to Mr. Bear who spearheaded this project.

REP Guidance was covered in initiatives.

The Annual Letter of Certification was submitted and approved. The letter includes information on training, public information, drills, plans, exercises, equipment, and siren results. Ohio EMA compiles
the letter, but input from counties and utility is required. Thanks to Mr. Pete Hill for compiling—he dia a phenomenal job. The letter will be distributed to NEPAC members.

Former Radiological Analyst with Ohio EMA and current Delaware County EMA director, Mr. Brian Gallagher, was in Japan when earthquake hit; he was on Naval Assignment. He met with members of the Radiological Branch last week and briefed on his experiences over in Japan after the crisis and lessons learned that would be relevant to the REP program. His key points were: keep it simple, work with what you have, ramp up quickly and keep lines of communication open. He said that he would come to a WG meeting and brief the group on the issues he discussed with the Radiological Branch. It was interesting to have the perspective of someone involved with nuclear power who was over there and was able to see response first hand.

Mr. Bear participated in a NRC web conference on March 21. The NRC did respond and send people over to Japan, but it did not affect domestic oversite responsibilities. They will be looking for short and long terms review topics-massive blackouts, seismic shifts, etc. There will probably be some changes to how we do business in the next few years. The NRC reiterated that they are certain of safety of U.S. reactors. There was a recent seismic survey performed by the USGS for the East Central U.S. There were no significant changes in seismic activity for this part of country, so that means no seismic changes for plants in our area.

Director Dragani asked when the NRC is planning on doing a review of issues—is there a time frame? Mr. Bear stated that within the first 90 days, there will be a short term review, but there is no time schedule for long-term review. Mr. Barker stated that there was a press release, which stated that there is a team assembled for task force and reviews will be done at 30, 60 and 90 days. The report will be sent to the Commission and will be a public report that will cycle down. That will set everything else in motion.

Director Dragani asked Mr. Barker if anyone at the NRC is working with the counties/states that are involved in NLE 11. Mr. Barker stated that he does not know if anyone has directly reached out to the states as of yet. He has not heard anything from the Region III standpoint and he would be involved in that reach-out to the states. Director Dragani asked how far west and south does Region III extends. Mr. Barker replied it is as far south as Illinois and Region III takes in material licensees in Missouri, Iowa and Minnesota. The Calloway nuclear power plant in Missouri would be for Region IV consideration.

EPA
Mr. Clayton gave the EPA Quarterly Report. EPA has also increased its’ water sampling after the Japanese events. EPA takes composite samples and test every month. Now, with the Japanese situation, they are taking each rain separately and analyzing that and have found elevated iodine readings in Painesville area. There may be other sampling stations around of Ohio.

EPA has been involved with Emergency phase procedure and IZRRAG procedure reviews.

The Radiation Assessment Team had training in response operations from March 9-11. The training emphasized meter usage and survey, as well as PPE and decontamination procedures. The training was sponsored by DHS and the team practiced with Franklin County. Part of the training emphasized multi-agency coordination and communication procedures.

The nuclear power plants have indicated that escorted access training required in order to participate in JIOPs now includes escort training. In the past EPA has not been participating in JIOP observations because environmental inspections did not happen often enough for someone at EPA to maintain escorted access status. Now that the escort training is now included in the escorted access training,
Mr. Clayton will have the opportunity observe some environmental inspections in conjunction with EMA or ODH.

ODH
Mr. Helmer stated that members of ODH participated in the URSB Working Group meetings and After Action Group, as well as the Training Working Group. In regards to NEPAC, he wanted to reiterate the importance of NEPAC and the ability of having state, utility and locals in the same room and a teleconference does not do that. This group is one of the most important groups that they have and affords an ability to address county and utility concerns. He is very pleased with JIOP program—it works well for the agencies, the utility and for the NRC.

ODH has a new director, Dr. Theodore Wymyslo. Mr. Michael Snee is now the Chief of the Bureau of Radiation Protection.

ODH has had a number of calls regarding precipitation sampling, which was somewhat surprising; there are more cisterns in state than we realize, especially in southwest and southeast Ohio. There is no reason to start a program for precipitation sampling because the U.S. EPA program is adequate. Continuous air monitoring has improved in Ohio. The U.S. EPA RadNet website provides continuous air monitoring.

In regards to the IZRRAG, Mr. Helmer believes it is important to keep-up with the group on a routine basis and just restart before exercise. ODH has been involving more of their staff on exercises, including x-ray. This does not represent any more of a need from the utility as far as support, but if we are able to have more people involved in exercise, we are in a better position to support around-the-clock operations if ever needed.

Director Dragani commented that she appreciated the Quarterly Reports.

B. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Mr. Allan Barker stated he will provide information on the oversight activities at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Beaver Valley Power Station and Perry Nuclear Power Plant. He will talk about Davis-Besse license renewal and NRC information notice 2011-05.

DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

In the March 4, 2011, assessment letter, plant performance was in the Regulatory Response Column of the NRC Action Matrix for the first three quarters of the assessment period due to a White inspection finding that was issued on December 28, 2009. The finding was closed in a letter dated December 28, 2010. The NRC determined that performance for the station during the fourth quarter of the assessment period was within the Licensee Response Column because all inspection findings being classified as having very low safety significance (Green), and all PLs indicating performance at a level requiring no additional NRC oversight (Green). Therefore, the NRC plans to conduct reactor oversight process baseline inspections.

The NRC identified a cross-cutting theme in the work practices component of the human performance cross-cutting area. Specifically, four findings were identified with the cross-cutting aspect of work oversight. The NRC determined that a substantive cross-cutting issue does not exist because the NRC does not have a concern with your staff’s scope of effort and progress in addressing the cross-cutting theme. Three of the findings were related to repair activities as a result of the identification of reactor vessel head nozzle penetration cracking.
Selected upcoming inspections from the 2011/2012 inspection schedule were identified.

Davis-Besse License Renewal

NRC License Renewal Environmental audit and the Safety audits for scoping and screening and the aging management program have been completed. The issuance of the supplemental draft environmental impact statement is projected for October 2011. The following link is for license renewal on the NRC public web site.

http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications.html

PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

In the March 4, 2011, assessment letter, plant performance was within the Licensee Response Column of the NRC Action Matrix. This was based on all inspection findings being classified as having very low safety significance (Green), and all PIs indicating performance at a level requiring no additional NRC oversight (Green). Therefore, the NRC plans to conduct reactor oversight process baseline inspections.

Performance at Perry during the assessment period continued to exhibit weaknesses in the area of human performance. In the mid-cycle assessment letter dated September 1, 2010, the NRC advised Perry of a substantive cross-cutting issue in the area of human performance with a cross-cutting aspect of work planning. The total number of findings with documented cross-cutting aspects in human performance remained constant with 14 findings in this assessment period. The assessment of the findings identified an additional cross-cutting theme in the human performance area, based on four findings with a cross-cutting aspect of documentation/procedures. In addition, while the number of findings in the work planning cross-cutting aspect decreased from four to three during the most recent assessment period, it is apparent that actions to date have not resulted in sustainable positive improvement in the area of work planning. Therefore, the human performance substantive cross-cutting issue will remain open in the documentation/procedures and work planning aspects until sustained performance improvement in the human performance area is demonstrated.

This assessment period is the seventh consecutive assessment period identifying a substantive cross-cutting issue in the human performance area first opened in the March 3, 2008, end-of-cycle assessment letter. Based on the results of the most recent assessment period, the actions taken in response to continued human performance errors have not demonstrated sufficient progress in addressing the issue. Perry's effectiveness at implementing sustainable corrective actions to address this substantive cross-cutting issue was reviewed during the biennial problem identification & resolution inspection in November 2010. The results of that inspection identified that improvements made to address the human performance substantive cross-cutting issue in work planning are not yet effective and that additional effort is needed.

In the September 1, 2010, mid-cycle assessment letter, the NRC notified Perry of the potential for the NRC to take additional actions not covered by the Action Matrix. Based on the assessment of actions to address the substantive cross-cutting issue in the human performance area, and NRC actions taken to date to assess Perry's performance issues, the NRC has determined that additional actions not covered by the Action Matrix are warranted. Prior to the 2011 mid-cycle assessment, the NRC will conduct an inspection of the long-standing, human performance substantive cross-cutting issue, beyond the baseline inspection program. Following notification of Perry's readiness for inspection, the NRC will perform an inspection to assess the effectiveness of corrective action to address the human performance substantive cross-cutting issue, specifically, the aspect of work planning. The inspection will focus on evaluating
Perry’s progress in developing and implementing corrective action and the metrics and measures used to determine performance improvement effectiveness. The NRC will conduct this inspection to evaluate whether adequate corrective action has been implemented for the human performance substantive cross-cutting issue; verify that the root causes of the issues have been identified; that their generic implications have been addressed; and that Perry’s programs and practices have been appropriately enhanced to prevent recurrence.

Selected upcoming inspections from the 2011/2012 inspection schedule were identified.

BEAVER VALLEY

In the March 4, 2011, assessment letter, plant performance was within the Licensee Response Column of the NRC Action Matrix. This was based on all inspection findings being classified as having very low safety significance (Green) and all Ps indicating performance at a level requiring no additional NRC oversight (Green). Therefore, the NRC plans to conduct reactor oversight process baseline inspections.

Selected upcoming inspections from the 2011/2012 inspection schedule were identified.

NRC Information Notice 2011-05, “Earthquake Effects on Japanese Nuclear Power Plants”

The NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 2011-05 on March 18, 2011, to inform addressees of effects of the earthquake on nuclear power plants in Japan. The NRC expects that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. This information notice is publically available from the NRC public web site.

IN 2011-05 communicates information such as, summary of events based on best available information, background on general design criteria for nuclear power plants, and NRC inspection action. The situation in Japan regarding recovery efforts for the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station continues to evolve.

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, “General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,” General Design Criterion (GDC) 2, “Design Bases for Protection against Natural Phenomena,” or similar appropriate requirements in the licensing basis for a reactor facility, requires that structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunami, and seiches without loss of capability to perform their safety functions. The design bases for these SSCs reflect: (1) appropriate consideration of the most severe of the natural phenomena that have been historically reported for the site and surrounding area, with sufficient margin for the limited accuracy, quantity, and period of time in which the historical data have been accumulated, (2) appropriate combinations of the effects of normal and accident conditions with the effects of the natural phenomena, and (3) the importance of the safety functions to be performed.

As a result of the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the NRC issued EA-02-026, “Order for Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures” (the ICM Order) dated February 25, 2002. The ICM Order, which is designated as Safeguards Information (SGI), modified then operating licenses for commercial power reactor facilities to require compliance with specified interim safeguards and security compensatory measures. Section B.5.b of the ICM Order requires licensees to adopt mitigation strategies using readily available resources to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and SFP cooling.
capabilities to cope with the loss of large areas of the facility due to large fires and explosions from any cause, including beyond-design basis aircraft impacts.

NRC assessment of the implications of beyond design-basis natural phenomena is continuing as more information becomes available. The NRC staff is currently developing a Temporary Instruction to guide staff in performing independent assessments of nuclear power plant readiness to address beyond design-basis natural phenomena under the Reactor Oversight Process. The NRC is considering additional generic communications and additional action including requesting operating plants to provide specific information relating to their facilities to enable the NRC staff to complete a regulatory assessment of beyond design basis phenomena.

END OF REPORT

Perry Nuclear Power Plant-Questions

Ms. O’Claire asked what Mr. Barker means by “additional actions outside the matrix.” Mr. Barker stated that with the action matrix, as they move through the columns, there are specific actions that are taken in each column. For example, sites with a White Finding, a supplemental inspection is done and that inspection is covered in the action matrix. In the last assessment letter, the NRC mentioned taking additional actions, such as an inspection that is not called for in the action matrix; the focus of the inspection would be on work planning and looking at root cause. The NRC noted on the docket in that letter that they were considering something above what is required by our program. For a White Finding, by looking at the procedure, you can tell what is going to happen; there will be a supplemental inspection to close it out and there is a time period that goes by before it drops off the performance level and that allows the transfer back to Column 1. To do something outside action matrix, notification and justification has to be provided because it has to go through the NRC also; there is a checks and balances system that allows a region to do that. This is what “additional actions outside the matrix” are.

Mr. Helmer asked where the report will be written up. Will that be included in the oversight program?

Mr. Barker stated that it will be a specific inspection once Perry Nuclear Power Plant says they are ready for an inspection. There will be another inspection report issued out and publicly available—it will stand alone.

Ms. O’Claire asked if that inspection is the inspection scheduled for September 2011.

Mr. Greg Halnon stated no; the inspection will probably be in June before the end of the cycle.

Mr. Barker stated that Perry Nuclear Power Plant will notify the NRC when they are ready for the inspection. The inspection will be completed before next assessment letter comes out. The NRC wants to perform the inspection and bring that performance knowledge to bear in their assessment prior to the next mid-cycle assessment period.

Ms. O’Claire asked when the time frame for the inspection is.

Mr. Barker stated that is based on when Perry Nuclear Power Plant as the licensee says they are ready for the inspection. The state will be made aware of the inspection.
Mr. Halnon stated that the Commission and staff stated that the 1st or 2nd week in June is probably when the inspection will be taking place. That will give them enough time to collect their thoughts and look at the assessment letter. Schedules still need to be coordinated.

C. UTILITY REPORTS

Mr. Ricky Collings of First Energy Nuclear Operating Company provided the utility report updates.

1. Beaver Valley Power Station

a. Unit 1 Outage/Unit 2 Outage

Unit 1 (1R20) - In addition to replacing 60 of Unit 1's 157 fuel assemblies, other projects and maintenance items completed during the outage included:

- "B" Reactor Coolant Pump seals and motor replacement
- Polar Crane power rail inspections and repairs
- "C" Containment Air Recirculation (CAR) fan motor replacement
- Top of Reactor Head inspections (completed with no issues identified)
- Containment Liner inspections
- Steam Generator secondary side inspections and cleaning
- Turbine/Condenser/Cooling Tower inspections and repairs
- Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1 preventive maintenance, including governor replacement
- No. 1-1 Battery replacement
- Turbine/Reactor Coolant Pump vibration monitoring equipment upgrade
- Plant computer replacement

Unit 1 has now operated for more than five years without experiencing a fuel defect. Unit 1's next scheduled refueling and maintenance outage is planned for spring 2012. There were zero OSHA Recordable or Lost Time Accidents and only two First Aids. This is the second time since 2R11 that BV has recorded zero OSHA Recordable Accidents. Complete Core Offload was completed in 42 hours which is the Best for BVPS Unit 1 and was industry top quartile performance.

b. Unit 2 (2R15)

Major 2R15 Outage Tasks
- Full core off-load, core reload with 64 new fuel assemblies
- Reactor Head Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) nozzle penetration weld inspections and repairs (one nozzle needed a minor repair)
- Steam Generator secondary side sludge lancing (cleaning) and foreign object search and retrieval (FOSAR)
- Steam Generator Primary side eddy current testing
- Reactor Coolant Pump seal inspections and replacements
- Containment Air Recirculation fan motor and rotating assembly replacements
- "B" CRDM fan motor replacements
- Containment Liner inspections
- Cooling Tower inspections and repairs
- Main Unit Generator disassembly and inspections (including Rotor removal)
- Emergency Switchgear Fan Replacement
• 2-1 Battery Replacement (60 cells)
• “B” Containment recirculation spray heat exchanger secondary side cleaning (gaining margin should it be needed during an accident)

Outage Goals (results still being tabulated)
• No safety issues
• Shutdown Safety is maintained
• Dose is below 85 Rem (85,000 mRem); 25 or fewer Personal Contamination Events (PCEs)
• Zero Human Performance-related Foreign Material Exclusion (FME) issues affecting plant operations
• No fuel defects identified
• No significant human performance events
• Achieve a breaker-to-2R16 run

c. Nov. 16 Unit 1 ECCS Relief Valve Leakage

On November 15th, 2010 during the performance of a Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit-1 surveillance test Safety Injection pump test, discharge relief valve lifted with approximately 20 gallons per minute leakage rate to the safeguards area sump. Engineering analysis determined that this leakage rate would exceed regulatory limits for projected Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) dose and projected Control Room Dose during a Design Basis Accident (DBA) transfer to recirculation. This required both BVPS Unit-1 and Unit-2 to enter technical specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.10 – “Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS)” for the Control Room Envelope (CRE). The relief valve leakage condition also required both trains of Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) to be declared inoperable per technical specification 3.5.2. These conditions were determined to be reportable per 10CFR50.72 “Unanalyzed Condition and Control of Radiation Release”.

The most probable Root Cause was determined to be a lack of organizational knowledge on relief valve sensitivity to nozzle loading effects from system piping. A contributing cause was that the existing discharge piping is placing an adverse force (i.e. nozzle loading) on the relief valve due to inadequate piping support and/or incorrect piping alignment. This causes the relief valve to lift below set pressure (235 psig).

Corrective actions will repair the existing discharge piping configuration for the valve and improve the configuration of the discharge piping for other similar valves. Corrective actions will review and revise engineering process documents to consider the effects of nozzle loading on relief valves. Corrective actions also exist to establish steps (barriers) in the Maintenance Relief Valve procedures and work order task list instructions to check for improper piping configuration, which will address extent of condition/cause going forward relative to other relief valves.

2. Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

a. License Renewal

License Renewal Application (LRA) was submitted to Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on August 30, 2010. NRC confirmed that the LRA was "sufficient for docketing" in October, and started their review process. An Environmental Public Meeting was held November 4, 2010. Approximately 40
people attended the majority of who supported Davis-Besse License Renewal. NRC License Renewal Audit and Inspection Schedule (2011):

- Scoping and Screening Audit held the week of January 24
- Aging Management Programs Audit held the weeks of February 14 and 21
- Environmental Audit held the week of March 7
- License Renewal Inspection the weeks of April 25 and May 9

A "Request for Hearing" by public interveners was sent to the NRC to express their concern regarding environmental aspects of the LRA. A public hearing was held at the Ottawa County Courthouse on March 1, 2011, regarding admissibility of the contentions raised by the interveners. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Judge will rule on admissibility of the contentions by the end of April. NRC began sending License Renewal "requests for additional information" (RAIs) in February 2011. Strong site support is being provided to ensure successful License Renewal Audits and Inspections.

b. New Areva Reactor Head

The new Reactor Head arrived onsite November 29, 2010. The Reactor Head fabrication was performed at Areva’s heavy equipment fabrication facility in Chalon, France. A series of acceptance testing was completed on the new head during manufacturing, which included radiography testing and dye penetrant testing (PT) to verify the Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) weld integrity of the head for certification and qualification.

The original plans were to install the new head during Davis-Besse’s 2014 refueling outage when the Steam Generators are scheduled to be replaced. However, Davis-Besse made a commitment to the NRC to accelerate replacing the head from the spring 2014 to October 1, 2011, following a series of Reactor Head modifications on the existing head during the site’s recent 16th refueling outage held in the spring of 2010.

c. November 5, 2010 Unanticipated Control Rod Movement/Feedwater Pump Vibration

At 11:28 a.m. on Friday, Nov. 5, Operations was establishing plant conditions to support replacing a fuse in the Control Rod 3-4 transfer module when the rod, while on its auxiliary power supply, unexpectedly moved from its normal 100-percent withdrawn position to approximately 72-percent withdrawn. This particular fuse was being replaced because routine predictive maintenance using thermography, a heat-sensitive imaging process, had indicated it was operating at an elevated temperature and posed a future failure risk. Plant operators responded promptly and correctly, entering the abnormal operating procedure for a misaligned control rod and beginning to reduce power. Once the plant was stable at approximately 50 percent power, a Problem Solving/Decision Making (PSDM) team was formed to resolve the issue.

The team divided the control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) and associated control system for Control Rod 3-4 into six segments, each representing a possible cause for the event. Each separate segment of the power supply, including the one with the fuse being replaced, was checked thoroughly and systematically for proper function and for any indications of faulty equipment or other potential issues. Although a specific cause has not been determined, the control rod’s entire power supply circuit was tested and found to be functioning normally. Following completion of the circuit checks, Rod 3-4 was recovered and realigned with the remaining rods for that Safety Group, and power ascension began just before midnight Sunday evening. The plant was back at 100-percent power by 2:29 a.m., Nov. 9. Additionally, to further improve Control Rod Drive system reliability, a planned outage was completed the weekend of January 8, 2011, to replace power supply components.
d. Inadvertent Siren Activation January 31, 2011

On January 31, 2011, at 0849 the Ottawa County Sirens inadvertently sounded due to a link failure between the Ottawa county siren activation touch screen console and the primary siren activation control system. It was determined that the touch screen operation is not a requirement of the system and was removed and replaced with a system which requires a key to enable the system. This action brought the Ottawa County Siren system inline with the remainder of the fleet siren operations. Ottawa County was the only location in the FENOC fleet that utilized a touch screen computer for siren activation. The ability to activate the offsite sirens was never compromised during this event.

Mr. Collings said he will provide an update on the Tritium leak at the next meeting.

3. Perry Nuclear Power Plant

a. Status of Cross-Cutting Areas of Human Performance (Work Plan)

During the NRC’s 2010 Annual Assessment of the performance at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP), which was communicated on March 4, 2011, the NRC determined that the PNPP operated in a manner that preserved public health and safety and fully met all cornerstone objectives. Plant performance for the most recent assessment cycle was within the Licensee Response column of the NRC’s Action Matrix, based on all inspection findings being classified as having very low safety significance (Green) and all performance indicators indicating performance was at a nominal, expected range (Green).

However, the NRC concluded that performance continued to exhibit weaknesses in the area of human performance. On September 1, 2010, the NRC advised the PNPP of a substantive cross-cutting issue in the area of human performance with a cross-cutting theme in the component of work planning (H.3(a)). During this assessment period, the total number of findings with documented cross-cutting aspects in human performance remained constant with 14 findings. The NRC’s assessment of the findings identified an additional cross-cutting theme in the human performance area, based on four findings with a cross-cutting aspect of documentation/procedures (H.2(c)). In addition, while the number of findings in the work planning (H.3(a)) cross-cutting aspect decreased from four to three, the NRC determined that PNPP actions to date have not resulted in sustainable positive improvement in the area of work planning. Therefore, the NRC concluded that the human performance substantive cross-cutting issue will remain open until the number of findings in the H.2(c) and H.3(a) aspects are reduced and PNPP demonstrates the implementation of effective corrective actions that result in sustained performance improvement in the human performance area.

b. Oct. 28 Sodium Hypochlorite Leakage from Underground Piping

On October 28, 2010, an unexpectedly large decrease in the Service Water System sodium hypochlorite tank level was noted by the chemistry technician performing the daily chlorination evolutions. Walk down of the chlorination systems was performed and the valve line-up was verified to be correct and no readily identifiable leakage was noticed. The chlorination system was shutdown and isolated. Notifications were made to the appropriate offsite agencies.

Subsequent investigation of the decrease in tank level included excavating a previously repaired underground pipe. This piping was found intact. Remediation activities continue consisting of soil excavation, inspection of all pipe couplings and repair of chlorination piping, and neutralization of contaminated soil.
Personnel are periodically sampling ground water monitoring wells that are in close proximity to the identified piping coupling areas. Results from the monitoring wells indicate that the hypochlorite has not migrated and remains contained onsite. The Sodium Hypochlorite storage tank is isolated and will remain isolated until repairs are complete. Manual Sodium Hypochlorite additions are being performed as required.

c. Refueling Outage 13

Scheduled for April 18, 2011 to May 21, 2011, 33 Days. The major focus of the outage is to improve plant reliability. The major areas being addressed are:

- Main generator stator rewind
- High pressure rotor inspection
- Drywell Cooling fan motor replacement
- Source Range monitoring cable replacement
- Extraction Steam Header replacement
- Division 2 diesel generator overhaul
- Replace 6 In-Vessel Monitoring Dry Tubes (used to remotely monitor individual areas of the core)

4. FENOC

a. Japanese Nuclear Plants Earthquake/Tsunami Update
   A visual presentation is being provided the day of the meeting.

b. Common dose assessment update FENOC Common Dose Assessment Status Update:

   - Funding for the FENOC Common Dose Assessment Software is approved for procurement and installation of the software at Beaver Valley Power Station and Perry Nuclear is scheduled for the year 2011.
   - FENOC Common Dose Assessment Project Manager met with FE Procurement Services personnel to discuss manner of payment and wording in 2011 contract to lock-in price quote from ABS Consulting Inc. for proposed procurement of dose assessment software for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station in 2012 budget. Additionally the specifications were finalized for the new dose assessment software.
     - Actual start date for programming is projected for late April or early May 2011.

c. E-data update

Beaver Valley – Networking software has been procured for the two simulator servers and is being installed. Point identifiers are procured and await the server networking software installation to be loaded. The e-Data web screens are developed and when data is flowing will be tested. Expect the simulators to be available to e-Data on the Production server by June 2011.

Davis-Besse – Simulator data has been used to test the system for both the actual plant and simulator web screens. The simulator portion was moved to Production server in mid-March 2011. Questions on how the data is displayed are being resolved with Davis-Besse Emergency Response personnel. It appears a few minor noun name changes and some units will need to be modified. These changes should allow Ohio to use the data with few changes to their existing dose projection program. The actual plant data screens will be modified when the simulator
screens are changed. It is expected that the system will be available in early June 2011. Ohio will continue to use the existing data system for the upcoming Evaluated Exercise.

d. WebEOC

- Fleet EP personnel have complete WEBEOC procedure and have submitted procedure to site ERS personnel for review and comments.
- Fleet EP personnel have complete WebEOC database and trained site ERS personnel on how to use database. They are currently testing database and will submit comments back the Fleet when testing is complete.
- Training modules and an exam bank have been developed to support the implementation schedule. Implementation of WebEOC is being integrated with the development of the new remote EOF/Alternate TSC as a result of pending NRC rule making. It is projected that WebEOC will be implemented fleet wide in early 2012 pending integration with state and local agencies.

END OF REPORT

Beaver Valley Power Station

There were no questions on Beaver Valley Power Station.

Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station

Mr. Helmer asked if containment will be cut twice.

Mr. Collings said the containment will be cut again.

Mr. Halnon stated that Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station’s containment is different than others-it has a steel liner that pressure vessel. The concrete is just missile protection.

Mr. Helmer asked if it will be the same spot.

Mr. Halnon replied an analysis has not been done yet. It depends cutting into the same place twice would compromises the integrity of the structure.

Perry Nuclear Power Plant

There were no questions on Perry Nuclear Power Plant.

FENOC-WebEOC

Ms. O’Claire stated she had been talking with Sam Paletta at Beaver Valley Power Station and they were looking at doing a drill or exercise in fall or winter, so they are prepared before the next evaluated exercise.

Mr. Collings said that everyone will get a chance to exercise the system.

Mr. Glenn McKee said that they will also use the new HAND initial notification form, but will not be used prior to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station evaluated exercise. All the forms will look similar, but with minor differences.

Director Dragani asked when the EOF’s would be online.
Mr. Collings replied that they should be online in late February/early March of next year. Construction will be complete this year and computers and furniture will be arranged early next year.

Director Dragani asked if the intent is to share information via WebEOC?

Mr. Collings replied that there are a number of things that we will have access to—a running joint log and the ability to look at priority boards. Each facility will have a task list and a priority board and the initial notification forms. We will also have the ability to watch forms being filled out before they are sent.

Ms. O’Claire stated that at one time, there was talking of a common JIC.

Mr. McKee stated that it is in the works. The issue is that money was spent on EOF’s this year. However, as we go forward, the building that FENOC wants to use is not available, but will be available soon.

Director Dragani asked if one JIC will support all three plants?

Mr. McKee stated that there are many issues and questions and bumps in the road to be worked out.

Mr. Fred Cayia of First Energy Nuclear Operating Company gave a presentation on the Japanese Nuclear Power Plants Earthquake/Tsunami Update/Iodine 131.

Mr. Helmer asked how much the damage from the explosions contributed to the problems.

Mr. Cayia stated that one of the reasons that there were modifications to have/add hard vents was to enable the hydrogen to be released from containment, out past the secondary containment. It appears they did not have the hard vents; instead, they had to vent primary into secondary containment and it does not take much for hydrogen to explode. The damage to three of the reactors is because of explosions. In one unit, the concrete walls were knocked over, which was not from tsunami damage. It will take a very long time to digest this. Repair efforts are being completed by using remote controlled bulldozers. On Unit 2, it appears there was a hydrogen explosion around the torus and that caused the breach, although the roof is still on.

Mr. Cayia stated that it is hard to imagine a situation the hardship of the situation on the plant staff. The town where their families lived in was essentially wiped away; there was no communication on or off-site. They were on their own to deal with this until outsiders got to site. When the tsunami wave hit; it changed the ballgame.

Mr. Kevin Clouse stated that he sees contaminated water as huge issue. He would imagine that as this progresses, what do you do with highly contaminated water-process—what do you do with it?

Mr. Cayia stated that this will be a long term problem; currently, they are using temporary storage tanks, but are figuring it out on the fly. This will be one of the major lessons—what do you do in this situation?

Mr. Helmer asked where Mr. Cayia obtained the information for his presentation.

Mr. Cayia stated that he obtains most of his information from the Nuclear Energy Institute website-Japan response. This provides a link to the Japanese equivalent of the NRC, the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum. These websites are open to the public.
Mr. Collings stated that the website has 8 million hits a day; it is becoming the clearinghouse for data. If the information is available, they have it. He stated that it is important to get AC power back; power then can be re-circulated to the core.

Mr. Clouse asked much damage has been done to water supply systems—was there any structural damage?

Mr. Cayia replied that most of pumps are underwater. There will be a need for extensive maintenance before they go back into service. Some areas are not accessible.

Mr. Barker said that maintenance will be hard pressed to be done by robotics. He also stated that it is important to get information from various sources. From NRC standpoint, they are cautious as to what they accept as valid information—we don’t know extent of damage and their designs. The NRC is providing an advisory type of role there. They are rotating people over there to provide technical expertise.

Mr. Barker stated that there were many were preventative actions that were put in place after Three Mile Island in 1979. The key point about design is how units are designed in 60s or 70s and along the way, changes were made based on learning from Three Mile Island and a post 9/11 environment and is built back in where appropriate. The ideal that designs stay stagnant is not true in U.S. One key point is if Japanese reactors had hardened vents—that is simple information about design that we do not have right now. There should be more to come on that. As the situation continues to unfold, we will learn and take advantage aggressively.

Mr. Kirchner asked, with regards to FEMA exercise in May in Illinois—is there anyone looking at if lost infrastructure is lost, how it would affect power plants?

Mr. Barker stated that was taken into consideration for exercise and how the NRC would support Illinois in that effort. At the site, they look at acceleration based on design. NLE may be looked at that at a different level and he does not know what the outcome is. He knows states are doing things internally outside of that exercise.

Mr. Cayia commented that Mr. Barker mentioned the B5B regulations put in place after 9/11. They had to put strategies in place to deal with a large aircraft impact on the site, which would cause significant damage. The revelation was that the changes were made and it does not matter how they incur the damage. The strategies put in place after 9/11 event would work just as well for this type of event. It is important to focus on making sure procedures, training and equipment is there. It does not matter the source of the damage; they have to be able to deal with it. It is highly important to keep the spent fuel pool full and cool.

Mr. Barker said another point is that their fuel supply tanks were above ground. In the U.S. plant designs, they are in structures below ground. An above-ground event would not disturb—that is a big difference from the U.S. standpoint.

V. Miscellaneous

A. Live Meeting/Video Conference Options

Michael Chesonis from the IT department gave a short presentation to the Board on options of how to widen the audience for the URSB meetings. He said that one option is to use Microsoft Live Meeting. Basically, presentation documents are put out on the web. A meeting session is set up.
People have to be “invited” to go to the session—the audience is still controlled. Also, they have the option to use video conferencing. It is important to think of who the audience is and who would benefit from this. He asked for opinions and if this would be valuable for this type of meeting.

Ms. O’Claire said that the NRC does video conferences and at the end of the meeting, they have the option to ask questions. We would need to incorporate some extra time to ask questions, so the meetings would have to include time for this. She does not know how you “get it out,” so it is public wide, or if certain people should just be invited. Can there only be a certain number of lines, or is it entirely public?

Mr. Barker said for an NRC public meeting, anyone can call into the meeting coordinator and get the information to listen in to the meeting.

Ms. O’Claire asked how people are made aware of the meeting. Can this be posted on the website?

Mr. Barker said that for the NRC, a meeting notice is posted on the website and public affairs officers in the locale of where the meeting is held will also advertise in the area. The meeting will also be publicized through the state liaison program. That is really an effort to get participation. Their agency has seen a difference even from when Mr. Barker started, in an effort to really get people involved. It is a dedicated effort.

Mr. Halnon stated that from their perspective, it does not matter if it is a public meeting, but to reiterate a FENOC policy, they will not answer questions from the public. They would help the NRC answer, if it was an NRC public meeting. Unless they would start to bring their public information officers and unless it was a straightforward yes/no answer, they would probably decline from answering. The situation would be the same in this meeting—if you had a person ask a question of the utility. Unless it is an easy public answer, they would decline from answering.

Mr. Halnon said that they would collaborate to help answer the questions and would not necessarily take a hard stance. It is difficult because over the phone, you don’t know who you are talking to. Are we trying to solicit information from people or is this just for informational purposes—to keep the public more informed.

Mr. Helmer stated that he believes the group needs time to think about this and think about who the audience would be.

Mr. Chesonis said it is important to identify audience and who you would want to attend—would this be the public in the nuclear power plant area, or other state agencies?

Mr. James Mehl asked how much of a demand is there existing for URSB information—do people request copies of the minutes, are there hits on the website, transcript; is there a demand or are we trying to drum up interest?

Ms. O’Claire stated that over the years, when we first held URSB meetings, there was a little more interest. There would be 3-4 people attend from the Citizens Advisory Council and 3-4 members of general public and media attend.

Mr. Clayton stated that a target audience that might want to be involved is the Radiological Materials Advisory Board members that were in the Citizens Advisory Council.
Mr. Halnon stated that any public meeting will have increased attendance depending on if there is an event of national public interest happening.

Mr. Helmer stated that this topic will be brought up at the next Working Group meeting

B. Next Meeting—July 11 at 1:30 p.m.

The next meeting will be held on July 11, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.

Mr. Helmer asked if any other issues need to be discussed.

Ms. O’Claire asked the Board members to sign a resolution from the October meeting. It was a resolution thanking Bob Owen for his service to board. At the time, they did not want to sign off on resolution while he was present at the meeting. This simply closes the loop on resolution.

VI. ADJOURNMENT

Mr. Helmer asked if there was a motion to adjourn. Mr. Kirchner of the Ohio Department of Agriculture motioned to adjourn the meeting at 3:46 p.m. Mr. Dan Fisher of PU CO seconded the motion. The motion was carried.

\[7/11/11\]
DATE

[Signature]
NANCY J. DRAGANI, CHAIR
Utility Radiological Safety Board