

UTILITY RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY BOARD

MEETING MINUTES

APRIL 15, 2013

Ms. Nancy Dragani, Ohio Emergency Management Agency, called to order the April 15, 2013 meeting of the Utility Radiological Safety Board at 1:32 p.m. at the Ohio Emergency Management Agency.

The first order of business from the agenda was the roll call taken by Tess Ocean.

Guests: Mr. Ricky Collings, Supervisor of Fleet Emergency Preparedness for First Energy Nuclear Operating Company and Mr. Dan Murray,

I. ROLL CALL

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

MS. NANCY DRAGANI
MR. MICHAEL SNEE
MR. CHUCK KIRCHNER
MR. DAN FISHER
MR. KEVIN CLOUSE
MR. DEAN JAGGER

A quorum was declared.

II. READING OF THE JANUARY 14, 2013 MINUTES (ADOPTED)

The board dispensed with the reading of the January 14, 2013 Minutes. Ms. Nancy Dragani, Ohio Emergency Management Agency, asked for additions, corrections or deletions to the minutes. Ms. Dragani asked for a motion to approve the minutes. Mr. Chuck Kirchner, Ohio Department of Agriculture moved to adopt the minutes and Mr. Kevin Clouse, Ohio Environmental Protection Agency, seconded. The motion carried.

III. OLD BUSINESS

A. URSB Working Group Report

Mr. Michael Bear, Ohio Emergency Management Agency, reviewed the URSB Snapshot spreadsheet, which is a roll-up of the snapshots that are sent out to the URSB Statutory members monthly after the URSB Working group meetings.

B. Midwestern Committee Report

Mr. Michael Snee, Ohio Department of Health, reported that there was not an update from the Midwestern Committee. The National Transportation Safety Forum meeting will take place in Buffalo next month. One topic that will be discussed at the meeting is the plan for spent fuel transport in the future.

IV. NEW BUSINESS

A. URSB WG Quarterly Reports

Each of the participating URSB agencies provided a report of their respective state agency activities. The Ohio Emergency Management Agency, the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency, the Ohio Department of Health and the Ohio Department of Agriculture all provided quarterly reports. Each agency's report is available on request from the URSB Secretary.

B. New Working Group Reporting Format

Ms. Dragani asked for feedback on the new Working Group reporting format.

C. Role of URSB and Relationship to the Working Group

The Board had a discussion regarding the role of the URSB and the relationship to the Working Group. The Working Group will bring up important issues in the Statutory meeting-this will be a standing item on the agenda. The Statutory Board members will then give the Working Group information on how to respond. Mr. Sneer stated that if the Working Group identifies an issue that needs to be responded to quickly, do not wait for the next Statutory meeting to bring up the issue.

D. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Mr. Allan Barker of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission reported on the following topics: Oversight of First Energy Nuclear Operating Company Plants, PNPP Dry Cask Storage of Spent Fuel, and Risk-Informed and Performance-Based Oversight. Mr. Barker's report is attached at the end of the Board-approved minutes.

E. Federal Emergency Management Agency

Mr. Dwaine Warren of the Federal Emergency Management Agency reported that the PNPP Final Exercise Report was delayed as 19/22 FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness staff were deployed in response to Hurricane Sandy, therefore the report was not as timely as usual. Reports should now be back on schedule.

The Hostile Action-Based exercise toolkit was just finalized. Mr. Warren will forward to Mr. Bear.

FEMA REP personnel are preparing for many upcoming exercises, including Clinton in March, DBNPS in May and DC Cook in June, which will be the first HAB exercise taking place.

He also reported that the Kewaunee Power Station in Wisconsin is shutting down in June. There will still be spent fuel storage on site. There will be a public meeting regarding decommissioning.

Mr. Warren stated that FEMA will be participating in the DBNPS exercises, with an FCO and representatives from the IMAT team. The day after the exercises, there will be a TTX with the FRMAC, DOE and FEMA representatives to discuss the recovery and mitigation process after a nuclear incident.

FEMA will also have an IMAT team participating in Vibrant Response.

F. Utility Reports

Mr. Ricky Collings of the First Energy Nuclear Operating Company provided the utility report on the following topics: Beaver Valley Power Station Hostile Action based Exercise Preparations, New Site Vice president, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station April 2, 2013 Dry Run Results, E-Data Status, MIDAS Status, Steam Generator Replacement project; DBNPS vs. San Onofre, and the Perry Nuclear Power Plant January 22, 2013 Reactor Scram and Outage status and the FENOC Media Orientation and Training Program. Mr. Collings report is attached at the end of the Board-approved minutes.

V. MISCELLANEOUS

A. Questions from the Public

There were no questions from the public.

VI. ADJOURNMENT

Ms. Nancy Dragani, Ohio Emergency Management Agency, asked if there was a motion to adjourn the meeting. Mr. Kevin Clouse, Ohio Environmental Protection Agency, made a motion to adjourn and Mr. Dan Fisher, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, seconded the motion. The meeting was adjourned.

NRC Report to the Board

Good Afternoon -----

I will update the board on the NRC oversight activities at Davis-Besse, Perry and Beaver Valley.

In addition, I will summarize the inspection oversight of Perry's Dry Cask Storage and the study on RERP oversight in terms of the potential to risk inform and performance base regulations.

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant

In the March 4, 2013, assessment letter, plant performance was within the Regulatory Response column of the NRC Action Matrix. This was based on one or more greater-than-green Security Cornerstone inputs on August 10, 2012. In addition to ROP baseline inspections, the NRC plans to conduct a supplemental inspection in accordance with Inspection Procedure 95001, "Supplemental Inspection for One or Two White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area."

Selected upcoming inspections from the 2013/2014 inspection schedule were identified.

Perry Nuclear Power Plant

In the September 4, 2012, assessment letter, plant performance was within the Degraded Cornerstone column of the NRC Action Matrix because of one or more greater-than-green findings in the Security Cornerstone, and a low-to-moderate safety significance (i.e., White) inspection finding and Notice of Violation (NOV) and a White Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness PI in the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone. This assessment is unchanged from that previously provided in Assessment Follow-Up Letter dated January 17, 2013, in which the NRC's decision was to deviate from the Action Matrix by maintaining Perry in Column 3 and not moving Perry to the Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone Column 4. The basis for the deviation is part of the Assessment Follow-Up Letter, and was effective as of January 11, 2013.

On December 28, 2012, the NRC issued an Inspection Procedure (IP) 95002 Supplemental Inspection Report which stated that Perry did not provide assurance that the corrective actions for performance issues associated with the Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness PI were sufficient to address the root and contributing causes and prevent recurrence. Specifically, the NRC determined that events occurred following your initial implementation of corrective actions for the White PI and White NOV which had similar root causes as the White PI and White NOV. As a result, a parallel PI inspection finding was assigned the same safety significance as the initiating PI. The White finding associated with the NOV was held open.

On February 20, 2013, the NRC met with Perry to discuss your plans and current progress in addressing the identified weaknesses. Perry's timeline indicated that the plant was working toward being prepared for the continuation of the supplemental IP 95002 inspection in June 2013. This inspection will be conducted in accordance with IP 95002, "Inspection for One

Degraded Cornerstone or Any Three Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area.” The inspection will focus on ensuring two objectives are met, but may be broadened as necessary. The first objective, which was not met during the initial inspection, will be to verify that Perry has put in place corrective actions to address and preclude a repetition of the root and contributing causes of the multiple occurrences of the Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness PI and will also assess whether the White NOV can be closed. The second objective, which was not completed during the 2012 inspection, will be to verify that Perry has identified the extent of condition and extent of cause of the individual and collective significant weaknesses that resulted in the White PI and White NOV.

Selected upcoming inspections from the 2013/2014 inspection schedule were identified.

Perry Dry Cask Storage

On February 7, 2013, the NRC issued the resident inspector fourth quarter 2012 integrated baseline inspection and an inspection of the initial operation of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation at Perry documented by Inspection Report 05000440/2012005 and 07200069/2012002. The following two findings are associated with Dry Cask Storage.

- A finding of very low safety significance (Green) was self-revealed for the failure to perform adequate maintenance on the single-failure-proof fuel handling building (FHB) crane used to handle dry storage casks containing spent nuclear fuel. The licensee corrected the issue prior to conducting lifts containing spent nuclear fuel and entered it into their corrective action program. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Resources, because the licensee failed to have complete, accurate, and up-to-date procedures that ensured personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources were available and adequate to assure nuclear safety.
- The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation of very low safety significance for the failure by the licensee to follow procedures that ensured the safe loading of a dry fuel storage canister into a storage cask. The licensee corrected the issue to restore compliance with the procedure and entered it into their corrective action program. The violation was determined to be of more than minor significance in that a procedural requirement was not met and the actual distance between the HI-STORM storage cask containing the dry fuel storage canister and the end of the rails on which the cask would be moved was less than the analyzed distance required to ensure safe transport operations. Since this violation was disposition using traditional enforcement, a crosscutting aspect is not applicable.

The additional findings were also documented by the inspection report.

- The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) for the failure to follow the Perry Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Plan that uses a standard emergency classification and action level scheme. Specifically, on June 7, 2012, Perry personnel failed to classify an Unusual Event for an unexpected increase in plant radiation levels when health physics surveys indicated an increase by a factor of 1000 times over normally expected area radiation levels. The failure to implement the emergency plan and classify an Unusual Event was that an independent review of the information, that the entry criteria for EAL GU1, Unexpected Increased Plant Radiation Levels, had not been met. The senior reactor operator (SRO) conclusion was based on highest general area dose rates which were 1.2 millirem per hour pre-spill and 650 millirem per hour post-spill. The SRO review did not evaluate the 30-centimeter area

radiation level in the pre- and post-surveys. Details identified that dose rate surveys taken prior to the spill in the resin spill area of the corridor were 0.3, 0.6, and 0.2 millirem per hour at 30 centimeters. The post-resin spill dose rate surveys in the corridor were 600, 1200, and 1500 millirem per hour at 30 centimeters, respectively. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Corrective Action Program, for evaluation and extent of condition. Specifically, Perry personnel failed to properly evaluate and classify an Unusual Event for the June 3, 2012, resin spill conditions in the corrective action program.

- A finding of very low safety significance (Green) was self-revealed for the failure of the licensee to make surveys to ensure compliance with 10 CFR 20.1601 and Technical Specification 5.7.2 from June 3 through June 7, 2012. Specifically, the licensee failed to evaluate the radiological conditions and potential radiological hazards associated with the spill of radioactive resins on the 574' elevation of the radioactive waste processing building that resulted in the failure to properly barricade and conspicuously post the area as required by 10 CFR 20.1601 and Technical Specification 5.7.2. The area was found to be accessible to personnel with radiation levels such that a major portion of the whole body could receive in 1 hour a dose greater than or equal to 1000 millirem. Corrective actions included performing complete radiological surveys of the area, posting and controlling the area as required by licensee Technical Specifications. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because the finding did not involve as-low-as-reasonably achievable (ALARA) planning or work controls, there was no overexposure or substantial potential for an overexposure, nor was the licensee's ability to assess worker dose compromised. The inspectors concluded that the most significant contributor to the finding was in the cross-cutting area of Human Performance with the component of decision making.

Beaver Valley

In the March 4, 2013, assessment letter, plant performance was within the Regulatory Response column of the NRC Action Matrix. This was due to one or more greater-than-green Security Cornerstone inputs on August 16, 2012. Therefore, in addition to ROP baseline inspections, the NRC plans to schedule and conduct a supplemental inspection in accordance with Inspection Procedure 95001, "Inspection for One or Two White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area."

Selected upcoming inspections from the 2013/2014 inspection schedule were identified.

Radiological Emergency Response Programs

A contractor will study the radiological emergency response program (RERP) oversight in terms of the potential to risk inform and performance base NRC regulations. The study will also explore the potential to more fully integrate RERP with the broader initiatives of DHS/FEMA in emergency preparedness. This work is being conducted in coordination with DHS/FEMA. The study will continue through 2013.

FirstEnergy update to the URSB

1) Beaver Valley Power Station

a) Hostile Action Based Exercise Preparations

Site Emergency Response Section (ERS) personnel and Beaver County EMA personnel observed the February 4, 2013 Three Mile Island HAB Table Top drill. ERS personnel and BCEMA personnel are also scheduled to observe the Limerick Power Plant HAB Exercise in November 2013 as a benchmarking opportunity. Lessons learned from this opportunity will be made available to other FENOC sites, their surrounding risk counties, and the states of Ohio and West Virginia. Two 2013 BVPS ERO Table Top drills have been conducted utilizing HAB scenarios. Two more ERO Table Top drills are scheduled during 2013 such that all four ERO Teams will have participated. The 2013 integrated site drills will also have a HAB focus.

b) New Site Vice President

Mr. Eric Larson new Vice President at the Beaver Valley Power Station



Mr. Larson has more than 25 years of experience in the nuclear power industry and joined FENOC as vice president, Nuclear Support, in 2011. Prior to that, he was plant general manager at Constellation Energy's Calvert Cliffs in Maryland and R.E. Ginna nuclear power plant in New York. He also served as maintenance manager at Ginna, and operations director and assistant plant manager at the D.C. Cook Nuclear Plant in Michigan. Previously, he held various operations supervisory positions at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant in New Jersey. He also worked at General Electric in North Carolina, AREVA in Virginia and Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory in New York. Mr. Larson has a bachelor's degree in marine engineering from the Massachusetts Maritime Academy and graduated with honors from the executive Master of Business Administration program of the University of Notre Dame. He was a licensed Senior Reactor Operator at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant.

2) Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

a) April 2, 2013 Dry Run Results

A Dry Run drill was held on Tuesday April 2nd in preparation for the May 14 NRC and FEMA evaluated Emergency Preparedness exercise.

52 objectives selected for the on-site portion of the dry run, 44 were fully met and eight were met with comments, meaning they represent opportunities for performance improvement before the May exercise. Critiques have been held to clarify and capture lessons learned for the players, and condition reports have been generated.

Off-site participants which included the state of Ohio and representatives of various emergency, law enforcement and health entities in Lucas and Ottawa counties, also are reviewing their performance in the dry run for improvement opportunities.

b) e-Data Status

The system continues to be available for simulated data. Live plant data has been streamed to the Developmental server for testing. The tests are underway with good results so far. Minor issues have been identified and are being pursued by Davis-Besse and fleet personnel. Some issues with simulator data were noted during the Dry Run drill in early April and those are also being pursued. Full implementation of the system is expected shortly after the Evaluated Exercise in May.

c) MIDAS Status

Testing of the software for Davis-Besse has been on going. Streaming of data from e-Data has occurred for both the simulator and plant data. Training material has been provided to Davis-Besse and is scheduled to begin in May and complete in late July. Davis-Besse expects to cut over to MIDAS from PCDOSE in August after the completion of training.

3) Perry Nuclear Power Plant

a) January 22, 2013 Reactor Scram

On 1/22/2013 at 03:32, the Plant experienced an automatic reactor SCRAM on low Reactor Water Level (Level 3) due to a loss of feed water. At the time of the event, the plant was in Mode 1 at 100% power. All control rods inserted into the reactor core. High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system actuated and injected to maintain reactor coolant level.

The loss of feed water occurred when a static transfer switch supplying power to the digital feed water control system did not transfer seamlessly causing a momentary power failure. The root cause investigation determined the most likely cause of the SCRAM was due to a failed component in the static switch. Additional investigation of the failure is being performed during the 1R14 outage.

b) Outage Status

Perry's 14th refueling and maintenance outage (1R14) approaches the end of its fourth week, focus remains on safe, event-free performance. The outage had a strong start with operators performing a safe and event-free shutdown of the unit at 12:01 a.m. Monday, March 18. Following disassembly of the reactor vessel components, including the removal of the 118-ton, 20-foot diameter Reactor Vessel Head, and the removal of the Reactor's 748 fuel assemblies completed on April 4th, critical path focus is on key projects including:

- Refueling and the replacement of 280 of the Reactor's 748 fuel assemblies
- Replacement of a Reactor Recirculation Pump seal cooler
- Functional testing of the Alternate Decay Heat Removal system
- Dose reduction valve replacements
- Replacement of the three low pressure turbine rotors

Outage Goals

- Industrial Safety: No OSHA Recordable Incidents
- Human Performance: No site or section clock resets
- Nuclear Safety: No reactivity events and no loss of decay heat removal
- Dose Goal: 287 REM
- Personal Contamination Events: Goal is less than 60

The plant is scheduled to return to service in early May.

4) FENOC

a) Media Orientation and Training Program

The offer of orientation and training to local media was done a number of times in past years. The offered sessions were not attended by any of the media. They have attended public meetings, the recent new EOF ground breaking and open houses. Additionally, the media has called and continues to contact FirstEnergy Communications with questions or to request a tour. They have attended media tours during plant outages. Historically the media has not attended an orientation and training day on Emergency Response and they choose to reach out directly to our communications staff when they have a question regarding our emergency procedures.

As a result of minimal to no interest in media training days a few years ago FirstEnergy began to send out informational packets to the media outlets with an offer to meet if the organization desired. No media outlets have requested an emergency planning training session and the information packets seem to be providing an adequate alternative to the sessions. FirstEnergy is considering scheduling an orientation and training day at each of the new EOFs in 2013 to see if the need for such sessions has changed. FirstEnergy Communications has reached out to plant counterparts to benchmark their media orientation and training programs to determine if we should schedule media training days for the sites or if another alternative is available. Little or no attendance at these events still requires valuable resources to schedule, prepare, and be ready to present the information. FirstEnergy communications has requested if these sessions are scheduled to have state and local EMA representatives available to answer general questions about emergencies.